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Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves?




It's 10:00 a.m. Do you know what your law partners are doing? Although the
partners at Baker & McKenzie, the world's largest firm, could not answer this
question, a San Francisco jury did answer a question presented to them regarding
the conduct of a Baker & McKenzie partner. In 1994, the jury awarded 7.1
million dollars in punitive damages to a former Baker & McKenzie secretary who
alleged that a Baker & McKenzie partner sexually harassed her.1
On the opposite coast, partners at the New York-based firm of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler (Kaye, Scholer) probably regret permitting Peter
Fishbein, a senior litigator with no financial institution legal experience, to
handle the regulatory examination of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association.2
Mr. Fishbein's contentious approach and unfamiliarity with regulatory matters
apparently contributed to the Kaye, Scholer nightmare, which threatened the
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. A research grant for this study was funded by the Texas
Bar Foundation. The author thanks the Board of Trustees of the Texas Bar Foundation for supporting this
project. The author also appreciates the thoughtful comments of Professor Curtis J. Berger, Harvey J.
Goldschmid, Teresa S. Collett, and Timothy W. Floyd. This article was written in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
1. Richard C. Reuben, Award a Lesson for Firms, Baker & McKenzie, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 19. The trial
court judge reduced the jury's award by half. See Nancy Erika Smith, Discrimination in Law Firms: Women Are
Not Going to Take It Anymore, NEW JERSEY LAW., Aug./Sept. 1995, at 8, 10 (arguing that Baker & McKenzie
ratified harassment by failing to conduct an investigation into the defendant-partner's behavior). The number of
discrimination claims lodged against law firms has increased substantially in the past few years. The U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission reported that worker complaints against law firms increased 58% during
the first half of the 1990s. Richard C. Reuben, Statistics Show Substantial Leap in Gender, Age and Disability
Claims, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 12.
2. As described in a critical account of facts, Peter Fishbein "turned a routine examination of Lincoln into a
contentious brawl." Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, Am. LAW., May 1992, at
68-69. In its defense, Kaye, Scholer obtained an opinion from ethics expert, Geoffrey Hazard. Professor
Hazard's opinion assumed facts emphasizing that Kaye, Scholer served as Lincoln's litigation counsel while the
firm of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue acted as Lincoln's regulatory counsel. See Summary of Expert Legal
Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reprinted in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENr RELATIONSHIP AFrER KAYE, SCHOLER,
381, 382-83 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992). According to John Villa, a
prominent legal malpractice defense attorney, the assumption that Kaye, Scholer was acting as "litigation
counsel" was important because "litigation counsel" have the "broadest leeway" to "characterize facts in a
light favorable to the client .... Steve France, Just Desserts: Don't Cry for Kaye, Scholer, LEGAL TtEs, April
6, 1992, at 28.
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solvency of the law firm and ultimately cost the firm and its partners forty-one
million dollars to settle the government's legal malpractice claims following the
failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association.3
A recent law firm scandal capturing the headlines involves the venerable
Richmond-based firm of Hunton & Williams. Some 120 victims have alleged that
Scott J. McKay Wolas, a valued rainmaker and leading litigation partner in the
firm's New York office, funneled 40 to 100 million dollars into a liquor sales
Ponzi scheme.4 In the firm's defense, the firm's managing partner insisted that
Mr. Wolas' partners did not know of or authorize any of his investment activities.5
In two federal cases, including one class action, filed against the firm and its
partners, the plaintiffs' attorneys will attempt to show that the firm's partners
should have known about Mr. Wolas' conduct, especially after three associates
blew the whistle to firm management.
6
In the wake of these cases and other multi-million dollar claims alleging
attorney misconduct, law firm partners are re-examining their relative autonomy
as well as their vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of their partners.'
Many partners have attempted to limit their vicarious liability by reorganizing
their firms as professional corporations, limited liability partnerships, or limited
liability companies. 8 Yet, reorganization does not guarantee that a firm and its
3. See Michael Orey, The Lessons of Kaye, Scholer, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 3 (suggesting that the
government's claims against Kaye, Scholer could have been avoided if a Kaye, Scholer banking regulatory
lawyer had participated in the engagement). Although Kaye, Scholer earned gross revenues of $185 million in
1990 and averaged $660,000 in partner profits, the firm faced potential insolvency when its creditors refused to
lend the firm additional amounts. Id. at 81. As illustrated by the threatened insolvency of Kaye, Scholer, the
"traditional view of the law firm as a stable institution with an assured future is now challenged by an awareness
that the largest and most prestigious firms are fragile economic units." ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM
BREAKUPS: THE LAW AND ETmics OF GRABBING AND LEAVING 1 (1990).
4. Ann Davis, Scandal Embarrasses Virginia's Hunton, NAT'L L. J., May, 13, 1996, at A1.
5. Id. at A23.
6. As explained by Professor Roy Simon, ethics expert at Hofstra University School of Law, Hunton &
Williams should have immediately referred the matter to disciplinary authorities once the associates reported
overbilling and false billing. Id. at A23 (describing other "red flags" that firm partners should have acted upon).
7. According to Professor S. S. Samuelson, at Boston University School of Management, "[liaw firms face a
fundamental dilemma in meeting the need for individual autonomy and centralized decision making while also
responding to the economic demands of the environment for more centralized control and planning." S. S.
Samuleson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from Management Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
645,661 (1990). In order to respond to the realities of today's marketplace, one law firm management consultant
has recommended that firms alter their traditional pyramid structure to assess partners periodically. See Ward
Bower, Rethinking Law Firm Organization - The New Pyramid, A.B.A. J., April 1989, at 90. Professors
Galanter and Palay, the authors of THE TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM (1991), agree that firms must rethink their organization, structure, and controls. In speculating
on the large law firm's future, Professors Galanter and Palay predict that partnership status will become "less of
a plenary or permanent reward, necessitating the design of additional incentives for performance and loyalty."
Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REv. 905,913 (1994).
8. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Captains: Kaye, Scholer The Office of Thrift Supervision, and
the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 985, 1014 (1993) (noting that firms have reorganized as
professional corporations and limited liability partnerships in an attempt to "make their pockets shallower" so
that they will be a less inviting target for legal malpractice claims). For a discussion of the nationwide trend of
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principals will be shielded from liability.9 The judiciary, in the exercise of its
inherent power to regulate the legal profession, may reject statutory limits on
principals' liability.' ° Even if courts recognize a limited liability shield that
virtually eliminates the vicarious liability of law firm principals, the firm's assets
and reputation remain at risk.1 Some firms are, therefore, taking steps to protect
the firm and its assets.' 2 These steps vary from simple systems for avoiding
conflicts of interest to more elaborate measures monitoring the conduct of all firm
attorneys.'
3
Because the majority of the claims against firms relate to the conduct of their
principals,14 legal malpractice experts and commentators have recommended that
law firms implement peer review to obtain information and to evaluate the work
of firm principals.1 5 Law firm peer review refers to the process in which firm
principals evaluate the work of other firm principals. Such peer review takes
law partnerships to reorganize as limited liability firms, see Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1994, at 54-57.
9. For a discussion of some of the ethical and practical obstacles practitioners may encounter as the result of
reorganizing as limited liability firms, see Anthony E. Davis, Limited Liability for Lawyers, PROF. LAW., Aug.
1995, at 1.
10. See Debra L. Thill, Comment, The Inherent Powers Doctrine and Regulation of the Practice of Law: Will
Minnesota Attorneys Practicing in Professional Corporations or Limited Liability Companies Be Denied the
Benefit of Statutory Liability Shields?, 20 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1151 (1994) (referring to the split in the
courts as to whether to allow attorneys to limit their vicarious liability). For example, the court in Stewart v.
Coffinan held that a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation was not vicariously liable
for the legal malpractice of another shareholder. 748 P.2d. 579 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. granted, 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1988), cert. dismissed, Aug. 19, 1988 (unpublished order). Contra First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302
S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983) (rejecting the statutory limits on liability "in the interest of professionalism").
Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Zagoria "to the extent that it states that this court, rather than
the legislative enabling act, determines the ability of lawyers to insulate themselves from personal liability for
the acts of other shareholders in their professional corporation." Henderson v. HSI Financial Services, Inc., 471
S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1996). This reversal illustrates the uncertainty involved in predicting whether courts will
recognize the new limited liability organizational structures.
11. Although a plaintiff could collect a legal malpractice judgment from the firm's insurance policy, other
firm assets, and the personal assets of a wrongdoer, the plaintiff could not collect against the innocent partners'
personal assets under the traditional theory of vicarious liability. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The
Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47. VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1750 (1994).
12. As explained by the Director of Quality Assurance at Long & Levitt, a firm that specializes in legal
malpractice defense work, firms are beginning to recognize that they can not rely solely on the skills and good
intentions of individual lawyers. Daniel W. Hager, Thriving in the 90's with Quality Law Practice, 3 LEGAL
MALPRACTICE REP. 1 (1994).
13. For a description of the procedures law firms have implemented, see Larry Smith, Still Reeling in the
Wake of S & L Suits, Law Firms Grope for Solutions, OF COUNSEL, August 3, 1992, at 1.
14. According to American Bar Association statistics, attorneys with ten or more years of legal experience
generate 66% of all malpractice claims. ABA STANDING COMMrrrEE ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE
LAWYERS' DESK GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE 31 (1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' DESK GUIDE].
15. For example, Robert O'Malley, loss prevention counsel to the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
(ALAS), a captive liability insurer insuring the nation's largest firms, has stressed the importance of peer review.
Larry Smith, Malpractice Update: Loss Control Not Always a Cure-All, OF COUNSEL, Feb. 1, 1993, at 1. In his
remarks at the Eighth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
O'Malley described how the legal malpractice problems afflicting large firms could be addressed through
partner peer review. 133 FR.D. 245 (1987).
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different forms ranging from monitoring compliance with established firm
policies and procedures including principals' completion of conflict of interest
checks to more subjective performance assessment of the manner in which the
reviewed principal handles his or her clients' problems. 16
Commentators identify a number of benefits that result from peer review.
17
First, peer review has been heralded as a safeguard to reduce the risk of
malpractice claims and grievances.1 8 Peer review also enables firms to evaluate
and enhance the quality of legal services. These efforts to improve the quality of
legal services impress existing and prospective clients, thus helping the firm to
retain existing clients and develop new business.' 9 Facing increased competition,
law firms may use peer review to distinguish themselves from other firms which
have not taken steps to foster an ethical atmosphere where principals are
accountable.2° Implementation of peer review measures helps firm partners
satisfy ethical duties under the various state versions of Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 5.1.21 Under Model Rule 5.1(a), a partner must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all attorneys in the firm comply with the Model Rules.22 Peer
review may undercut an intra-firm perception that emphasizes "rainmaking" at
16. One commentator insists that subjective performance assessments include the following components: (1)
a process to obtain critical, candid, and informed assessments of legal work performed; (2) a commitment to
analyze such assessments and furnish direct and meaningful feed-back to the reviewed attorney; and (3) a
recognition of the need to implement appropriate mechanisms or changes necessary to maintain and enhance
quality and competence. Harry H. Schneider, Jr., One Approach to Partner Peer Review: The Client Audit, LAW.
LIABILITY REVIEW, Aug. 1987, at 1-2.
17. For a thorough discussion of the objectives of peer review, see John E Corrigan, Assuring Quality
Through Oversight of Partners and Other Quality Assurance Techniques, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON
CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., LAW PRACTICE QUALrrY EVALUATION: AN APPRAISAL OF PEER REVIEW AND OTHER
MEASURES TO ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE 301, 305-07 (1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMSBURG REPORT].
18. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulatory Environment: An Introductory
Overview, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 181, 211 (1994) (suggesting that firms are likely to impose internal controls
such as peer review when the firm itself will be liable for professional misconduct).
19. See WILLIAMSBURG REPORT, supra note 17, at 305 (explaining that quality assurance can be a selling
point). A survey of Fortune 500 general counsel revealed that 71% of the respondents indicated their selection of
outside counsel would be influenced by a firm's implementation of a Total Quality Management Program.
Nancy Blodgett, More and More Firms Take the TQM Plunge, LEGAL MGMT., May-June 1993, at 25.
20. See Hager, supra note 12, at 1 (suggesting that "an effective quality program will help separate those
firms that thrive in the 1990s from those that stagnate or, as is more and more often the case, cease to exist").
21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.1 (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. See also Types of
Practice, LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) § 91:201-203 (Apr. 22, 1992) (discussing the various
versions of Model Rule 5.1 adopted by states). A recendy adopted New York disciplinary rule requires that law
firms "make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the disciplinary rules." 22
NYCCR Part 1200.5(a). The rule further states that a "law firm shall adequately supervise, as appropriate, the
work of partners, associates and nonlawyers who work at the firm." Id. In adopting this rule, New York became
the first state to authorize professional discipline against entire law firms. Ann Davis, N. Y Makes Firms Liable,
NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1996, atA6.
22. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(a) ("A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.").
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the expense of other contributions. Peer review also cultivates an institutional
perspective of the law firm as a team rather than an association of attorneys
sharing offices.23
Despite the benefits, some skeptics question the feasibility of peer review
because principals in law firms tend to function as islands unto themselves.24 This
opinion may not accurately reflect practitioners' perspectives on peer review or
their ideology regarding law firm practice. As noted by Professors Robert L.
Nelson and David M. Trubek, "We do not know how lawyers in various
organizational and institutional locations throughout the profession see the
contexts in which they operate, define the interests they pursue, and perceive
obligations they must honor.", 25 This Article addresses these questions by
studying law firm peer review and the professional ideologies that affect law firm
practice.
Using empirical data obtained from a survey of Texas law firms, this Article
examines how attitudes and law firm culture affect peer review and principal
accountability. My central thesis is that firms with a team culture are more likely
to implement peer review than firms that function as a confederation of individual
practitioners.26
After briefly describing the research design and the general profile of respon-
dents in Part I, Part II discusses peer review measures used by the firms surveyed
for this Article. Part III analyzes attitudes about peer review; Part IV focuses on
the obstacles to peer review. Part V considers the connection between firm culture
and the implementation of peer review measures. Finally, the conclusion explains
how firm managers can reshape attitudes to address the resistance to peer review




The survey, conducted in the summer of 1995, targeted all Texas law firms
23. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
329, 344-48 (1995) (discussing additional reasons why firms should consider peer review measures). Finns may
institute peer review as a risk management measure because courts may not recognize statutory limits on
attorney liability. Peer review measures also boost intra-firm communications and help firms in defending
against claims that firm attorneys failed to monitor an alleged wrongdoer. Id.
24. At the 22nd ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility, one conference participant
expressed such skepticism, stating that "the problem is not finding out who the bad guy is, but in getting firms to
do something about the situation." Conference Draws Record Attendance, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1996, at 20, 22
(quoting Peter Jarvis, a partner with the Portland firm of Stoel, Rives, Boley, Jones & Grey).
25. Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of
Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERs' PRAcncEs 3 (Robert L. Nelson, et al. eds., 1992).
26. Management consultants use the terms "team" and "confederation" to characterize different approaches
to group law practice. For a discussion of the differences in the two approaches, see MARY ANN ALTMAN &
ROBERT I. WErL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACnCE MANAGEMENT § 2.09 at 41-47 (2d ed. 1987).
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with ten or more attorneys. The study did not include firms with less than ten
attorneys because principals in such firms know each other and can rely on
informal peer review rather than formal measures.27 Using information obtained
from the Interest on Lawyer's Trust Accounts Program (IOLTA) administered by
the State Bar of Texas, 28 the survey instrument was sent to each firm's managing
partner or principal. 2 ' The four-page survey instrument included questions on the
firms' peer review measures and the respondents' attitudes on peer review, law
firm liability, and firm culture.30 The instructions asked recipients to respond
within one month. The mailing included the four-page questionnaire, a self-
addressed envelope, and a response card.31
B. POSSIBLE SAMPLING ERRORS
By mailing the survey instrument to all Texas firms that reported ten or more
attorneys to the State Bar of Texas IOLTA program, possible sampling error was
reduced.32 The IOLTA list of firms proves to be more reliable than lists drawn
27. In comparing supervision and training in large and small firms, Professor John Dzienkowski suggests the
following reasons why formal review takes on a different dimension in large law firms:
In small firms, it is likely that individuals who practice together share common values and are of a
similar mindset. Furthermore, clients of small firms are more likely to seek an individual lawyer in a
firm rather than signing on with the firm itself because of the firm's reputation. In the large firm,
partners are not likely to work with all of the other lawyers on a regular basis, and are more likely
focused on the work within their section or practice or perhaps in one or two related areas.
John Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm: Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as
Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX.
L. REv. 967, 976-77 (1995) (footnote omitted).
28. The Texas State Bar Rules establish the Texas Equal Access to Justice Program, commonly referred to as
the "IOLTA Program" [hereinafter IOLTA]. These rules require that all practicing attorneys receiving "client
funds that are nominal in amount" or "reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of time" place the
funds in an interest-bearing account. TEx. Gov'T CODE AN. tit. 2, subtit. G., app., art. XI, § 5(A) (West Supp.
1996). Attorneys must provide the IOLTA Program with information on such accounts. Id. at § 5(C).
Information gathered from these reports was used to compile the list of firms to whom questionnaires were
mailed. If the IOLTA list did not indicate firm size, the firm was not sent a questionnaire. Although the vast
majority of the firms reporting no firm size appeared to be solo practitioners, some firms in the target population
could have been excluded if they did not have a firm size indicated on the IOLTA list.
29. The name of the firm's managing partner was obtained by contacting each firm. When a firm did not
designate a managing partner, the survey instrument was sent to a member of the firm's management or
executive committee. The survey instrument was sent directly to the firm's managing attorney because such an
attorney logically sits in the best position to answer questions on firm policies and procedures, and may be more
inclined to devote time to responding to a survey dealing with management issues.
30. The questionnaire included a fifth page for comments. Prior to finalizing the survey instrument, an
informal pretest was conducted with a selected group of attorneys who criticized the survey instrument and
technique. See Appendix for the final survey instrument.
31. The instructions asked the respondents to mail the response card separately from the questionnaire. This
preserved the anonymity of the questionnaires, while still enabling the tracking of responses.
32. See FRANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 17 (1981)
(explaining that a mail survey provides a larger sample, increasing the external validity of the results and the
degree to which conclusions can be generalized to the entire population).
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from legal directories such as the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory or the Texas
Legal Directory. These directories only include descriptions of those firms that
pay a fee to the publishers.33 Conversely, the IOLTA listing covers all Texas firms
since all Texas attorneys must report to the IOLTA program under Texas law.
34
For technical reasons related to data entry, not all firms on the IOLTA list
indicated the specific number of attorneys associated with the firm. To verify that
the survey population included all of the largest Texas firms, I compared the
survey population to a published list of "Texas' 100 Largest Firms of 1995." 5
This comparison indicated that only two firms were not included in the IOLTA
list. The first firm was an out-of-state firm with only two Texas attorneys; the
second split-off from another firm that was already included in the survey
population. Subsequently this second split-off firm was also included in the
survey population. Thus the survey included the one hundred largest firms in
Texas.
C. POSSIBLE NONRESPONSE ERROR
A total of 191 out of 311 law firms responded to the questionnaires mailed,36
resulting in an overall response rate of 61.4%.37 Compared to other Texas bar
surveys, the survey appears to have achieved among one of the highest response
rates.38 A number of factors may have attributed to the high response rate. First,
the cover page of the questionnaire explained that the study was partially funded
by the Texas Bar Foundation. That fact probably impressed respondents, as Texas
attorneys perceive the Texas Bar Foundation as a prestigious group that funds
worthy projects. 39 The cover page of the questionnaire included the insignia of
the Texas Tech University and the address of the Texas Tech University School of
33. See id. at 21 n. 12 (discussing the limitations of using the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory in empirical
research).
34. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G., app., art. XI, § 5(C).
35. Texas'100 Largest Firms of 1995, TEx. LAw., July 3, 1995, at Supp. 28.
36. The firms fell into the following categories: (1) 40 firms reported over 50 attorneys; (2) 62 firms reported
26 to 50 attorneys; and (3) 209 firms reported 10 to 25 attorneys. Although the IOLTA listing may have indicated
that a firm had a certain number of attorneys, the actual number of firm attorneys may have changed by the time
the respondent completed the survey instrument. By the time of the survey, 13 firms had reduced in size to less
than 10 attorneys. The results also indicated an increase in the number of firms reporting more than 50 attorneys.
37. In the category of firms with over 50 attorneys, the response rate was 87.5%, followed by a response rate
of 64.5% for firms with 26 to 50 attorneys. Firms with 10 to 25 attorneys had the lowest response rate (49.3%).
The fact that 13 firms had lost attorneys and reported less than 10 attorneys explains the lower response rate for
the category of firms with 10 to 25 attorneys.
38. See Letter from Dr. Cynthia Spanhel, Director of the State Bar of Texas Department of Research &
Analysis to Susan Saab Fortney, dated 5/9/96 (reporting that the 61.41% rate appears to be among the highest
response rate achieved on such a study conducted by the Texas State Bar Department of Research and Analysis)
(on file with author).
39. See, e.g., Richard Pena, Texas Bar Foundation: A Window to the Future, TEx. B.J., Oct. 1996, at 864. See
also Tex. BAR FouND. ANN. REP. (1995-1996) (describing the Texas Bar Foundation's mission to improve the
legal system and the administration ofjustice through financial support of educational and charitable activities).
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Law. The survey introduction underscored the fact that the responses would be
anonymous. The introduction also communicated why the response was impor-
tant. Specifically, the introduction emphasized that responses were imperative to
provide an accurate picture of the attitudes and approaches of Texas law firms.
The questionnaires were personally addressed to the firm's managing partner or
an attorney acting in a management capacity. The questionnaire also indicated
that survey results would be sent to the respondents, thus providing an additional
incentive to respond. Finally, those who had not responded within one month
were sent a second copy of the questionnaire.'n
Attorneys may not have responded for different reasons including lack of time
41or interest. Some attorneys who did not respond may have been reluctant to
reveal that their firms had no peer review or limited peer review procedures. If
that hypothesis were true, such a widespread failure to respond could result in
nonresponse error since the survey results would not accurately reflect the
practices and attitudes of all Texas firms. However, the survey results reveal that a
large percentage of respondents did not use formal peer review procedures,42 thus
the results do not appear to suffer from this bias. Nothing indicates that
nonrespondent firms differed from the respondents in size, composition, or any
other statistically-relevant characteristic.
D. RESPONDENTS' GENERAL PROFILE
Respondents fell into four size categories: 35 respondents (18%) were "Large
Firms" (more than 50 attorneys); 40 respondents (21%) were "Medium Firms"
(26 to 50 attorneys); 103 respondents (54%) were "Small Firms" (10 to 25
attorneys). Although the survey did not target firms with less than 10 attorneys,
13 respondents (7%) indicated their firm included 2 to 9 attorneys. Evidently,
these firms lost attorneys subsequent to reporting to IOLTA that such firms
contained ten or more attorneys.
The survey responses reflect the efforts by most law firms to limit their
principals' vicarious liability by reorganizing as professional corporations or
limited liability partnerships. Although firms in Texas can operate as limited
liability partnerships or limited liability companies, Table 1 shows that the
majority of the respondents practice in firms organized as professional corpora-
tions.
43
40. As a final measure, a student assistant called those persons who had not responded.
41. In declining to complete the questionnaire, one attorney stated that a "thoughtful response" would take
over an hour.
42. For example, 169 respondents (88%) report that their firms do not use formal procedures for reviewing
the work of principals, other than review conducted in connection with compensation decisions.
43. Following the storm of malpractice suits against major Texas law firms, the Texas legislature enacted
various statutes to limit professionals' liability. In 1989, the Texas legislature modified the Texas Professional
Corporation Act to explicitly state that "the corporation (but not the individual shareholders, officers or
directors) shall be jointly and severally liable" with the tortfeasor. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 16
[Vol. 10:271




TYPE OF STRUCTURE RESPONDENTS OF SAMPLE
General partnership 9 5%
Professional corporation44  110 57%
Limited liability partnership 67 35%
Limited liability company45  5 3%
Total 191 100%
In sum, 182 (95%) of the respondents practice in some form of limited liability
firm or professional corporation.4 6 By contrast, only 9 of the respondent firms
(5%) function as general partnerships with unlimited liability. Such a disparity
indicates that Texas firms have participated in the national movement to change
their firm's structure and thereby limit their principals' vicarious liability.47 More
firms operate as professional corporations rather than limited liability partner-
ships or limited liability companies. Presumably, these firms incorporated before
Texas enacted legislation enabling firms to operate as limited liability partner-
ships and companies.48
(West Supp. 1996). Following banking regulators' malpractice lawsuits alleging failure by principals to
supervise their peers, the legislature in 1991 amended section 5 of the Texas Professional Corporation Act to
state that "[a] shareholder of a professional corporation, as such, shall have no duty to supervise the manner or
means whereby the officers or employees of the corporation perform their respective duties." Id. at art. 1528e,
§ 5. In 1991, the Texas legislature was the first in the nation to enact a limited liability partnership act. Id. at art.
6132b-3.03. That year the legislature also adopted a limited liability company act. Id. at art. 1528n.
44. This total includes one respondent who checked both the "general partnership" and "professional
corporation" categories. This response was interpreted to refer to a general partnership composed of
professional corporations, which placed the firm in the professional corporation category.
45. This total includes one firm described as a "professional limited liability company."
46. The actual liability shield varies depending on whether a firm operates as a limited liability partnership
("LLP"), limited liability company ("LLC"), or as a professional corporation ("PC"). Under the Texas
Professional Corporation Act only the individual attorney and the PC are jointly and severally liable for the acts
or omissions of the individual attorney. T~x. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 16. Other shareholders, officers,
and directors are not liable for the misconduct of other firm attorneys or for other corporate debts. Id. A similar
shield extends to members of LLCs. See id. at art. 1528n, § 11.05. Unlike LLCs and PCs, the Texas LLP only
protects a partner from vicarious liability for another partner's malpractice. Id at art. 6132b, § 15(2). Although
the Texas LLP structure provides less protection than the LLC or PC structure, firms may still prefer the LLP
structure because it allows the firm to continue to function as a partnership, avoiding state franchise tax. Id. at
§ 171.001(a).
47. See Deborah A. Demott, Our Partner's Keepers?Agency Dimensions of Partnership Relationships, LAW
& CowrEMp. PRoas. 109 (1995) (discussing this trend and the consequences of allowing law firm partners to
limit their vicarious liability).
48. The Texas limited liability partnership legislation originated as an alternative means for allowing
professionals to limit their liability without subjecting themselves to the federal income tax consequences of
practicing in professional corporations. R. Dennis Anderson et al., Registered LLPs, Tx. B.J., July 1992, at 728.
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The following table shows firm organization and firm size.
TABLE 2
FIRM STRUCTURE AND FIRM SIZE
LARGE FiRMs MEDIUM FiRMs SMALL FIRMs
OVER 50 26-50 10-25
ATTORNEYS ATORNEYS ATORNEYS
N=35 N=40 N= 103
General partnership 14% 3% 3%
Professional corporation 31%49 72% 58%
Limited liability partnership 51% 25% 36%
Limited liability company 3% 0% 3%
These percentages reveal that even the smallest firms in the survey operate as
limited liability partnerships and companies. Multi-state obstacles and other
complications related to large firm reorganization probably explain why the
largest percentage of general partnerships is found among law firms with more
than fifty attorneys.50 However, the majority of law firms consisting of over fifty
attorneys are organized as limited liability partnerships. Limited liability partner-
ships provide protection to law firm principals. Moreover, converting from a
general partnership to a limited liability partnership appears to be much easier
than converting to a professional corporation or limited liability company.51
II. PEER REVIEW MEASURES EMPLOYED
The questionnaire defined "peer review" as "the process in which law firm
partners or principals monitor and evaluate the job performance of their col-
leagues.',52 Given the number of incorporated firms, the survey used the term
49. As discussed in note 44, one respondent checked both "professional corporation" and "general
partnership." Assuming that the firm operates as a general partnership of professional corporations, the firm was
included in the professional corporation category. The percentages in the large firm category do not total 100%
because of rounding to the nearest whole number.
50. See Dzienkowski, supra note 27, at 987-88 (discussing problems interstate firms may encounter in
reorganizing).
51. Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1993, at 30. Unlike the
simple procedure of registering as an LLP, the conversion to a professional corporation ("PC") or to a limited
liability company ("LLC") requires that a firm rewrite its partnership agreement, form a board of directors, and
appoint officers. Id. Moreover, registration as an LLP appears to be the most economical vehicle for obtaining
limited liability, because the LLP structure avoids possible double taxation imposed on PCs and their
shareholders, and avoids franchise taxes imposed on both Texas PCs and LLCs.
52. See Appendix, introduction to questionnaire. In this context, "colleagues" refers to other firm partners or
principals.
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"principal" to denote equity holders in law firms, including members of partner-
ships and shareholders in corporations.53
Peer review covers a spectrum of approaches and procedures designed to
enable law firm principals to monitor and evaluate their fellow principals.54
Traditionally, firms have confined partner review to the evaluation of partner
productivity and contributions for compensation purposes.55 Now, an increasing
number of firms are setting the stage for peer review by adopting standard
procedures and policies applicable to all firm attorneys. For example, firms
typically implement policies and procedures relating to conflict checks, engage-
ment letters, and opinion letters.56 When firms actually monitor principals'
compliance with established procedures and policies, they institute a rudimentary
form of peer review. 57 Compliance with these technical standards can be
determined by auditing selected client files.58
Firms also utilize peer review committees to obtain more substantive informa-
tion on principal performance. The committee solicits information from the
firm's principals, and in some cases, its associates.59 In addition, a peer review
committee can obtain client feedback by conducting a client audit. 60 This
information helps the committee assess the principal's performance and client
satisfaction.6'
53. Id.
54. See John F. Corrigan, Peer Review in the Law Office, in THE QuALrrY PURSUIT 61, 62 (Robert Greene ed.,
1989) (describing peer review as an "expandable" term). For a description of peer review models, see RONALD
E. MALLFN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.31 (4th ed. 1996). See also Fortney, supra note 23, at
363-70 (describing models of peer review in law firms).
55. See William Freivogel, Specific Forms of Partner Peer Review (Apr. 19-20, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (originally prepared for the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability Conference, Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose Time Has Come) (explaining that the
compensation process has generally moved away from lock-step allocation of income based on seniority to
allocation based upon other factors such as business controlled and hours worked).
56. As revealed by a 1992 study of fifty law firms nationwide, the majority of respondents utilized
computerized conflicts systems, required engagement letters, and required second partner review of formal
opinion letters. Stephen R. Volk et a., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in An Era of Increasing
Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 Bus. LAw. 1567, 1571, 1573, 1581 (Aug. 1993).
57. The Denver firm of Rothgerber, Appel, Power & Johnson has successfully incorporated technical
standards review into their peer review program. Scott Graham, Four Divergent Approaches to Peer Review,
RECORDER, May 24, 1991, at 5.
58. See Anne E. Thar, Start a Peer Review Program, 82 ILL. B. J. 447,447 (1994) (suggesting that file review
focus on the following items: conflicts checks, engagement letters, organization, documentation, and client
communication).
59. Although associates may not be able to evaluate the partners' lawyering skills, associates can provide
"valuable feedback on partners' skills as supervisors, teachers and mentors." Daniel W. Hager, Measuring
Quality, 3 LEGAL MALPRACICE RaP. 30 (1994) (suggesting that supervisory reviews help the firm determine if
firm personnel are functioning as a team).
60. Rather than using an internal committee, firms may retain outside consultants to conduct client audits.
The firm committee or outside consultants may interview clients or may rely on client survey forms. See HENRY
W. EWALT, THROUGH THE CLIENT'S EYES: NEW APPROACHES TO GET CLIENTS TO HIRE YOU AGAIN AND AGAIN
167-68 (1994) (providing sample survey forms).
61. The Seattle-based firm of Perkins Coie pioneered client audits conducted by firm attorneys. The firm uses
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A. FIRM CONTROLS ON PRINCIPALS SERVING AS OFFICERS/DIRECTORS
The questionnaire inquired about specific peer review measures. Numerous
questions asked whether the firm had established policies and procedures relating
to the delivery of legal services. The first set of questions asked whether the firm
adopted various internal controls. The responses reveal that many firms have
taken steps to avoid problem areas identified by legal malpractice insurers and
commentators.62 For example, legal malpractice experts recommend that firms
prohibit or carefully monitor firm attorneys acting as officers or directors of
for-profit entities.63 Legal malpractice plaintiffs, most notably the federal bank-
ing regulators, target attorneys serving on clients' boards of directors.64 To avoid
exposure for conflicts created when attorneys serve on corporate boards, some
firms have adopted internal policies prohibiting such service.65
Indeed, the majority of the respondent firms appreciate the risks associated
with attorney-directors and have firm policies to manage the problem.66 A total of
client audits to develop business, improve client relations, and prevent malpractice claims. Amy Bach, Partners
Succumb to Checkup From Peers, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 30, 32.
62. See Dennis J. Block et al., Lawyers Serving on the Boards of Directors of Clients: A Survey of the
Problems, INsiGTrs, Apr. 1993, at 3, 8 (explaining that professional liability insurers have discouraged the
practice of attorney-directors and have added policy provisions specifically excluding all malpractice claims
relating to conduct that occurred when a member of the law firm held an executive office with a client
corporation); see also Reilly C. Atkinson & Edward F Donohue, Risks of Serving on a Client's Board of
Directors, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 5 (1990) (providing recommendations on dealing with coverage gaps
created when attorneys serve as directors and related malpractice prevention techniques).
63. See, e.g., Jett Hanna, Business Ties with Clients Still Perilous, TEx. LAWYERS' INSURANCE EXCHANGE
LEGAL MALPRACTICE ADVISORY, No. 2, 1995, at 2 (warning against attorneys serving on corporate boards
because such service is "fraught with perils"). For a discussion of law firm policies dealing with attorneys
serving on corporate boards, see David B. Parker et al., Law Firm Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws,
INSIGHTS, March 1992, at 19.
64. See Charles F Byrd & Isabella W. Sammons, FDIC Legal Action Against Attorneys and Other
Professionals, 108 BANKING L. J. 420, 422 (1991) (explaining that banking regulators claims against attorneys
commonly involved attorneys who served on the financial institutions' boards of directors). Paul Grace, former
Associate General Counsel and Director of FSLIC Litigation, acknowledged that the federal banking regulators
would be more likely to investigate and sue attorneys who served as members of the boards of directors of failed
financial institutions. John Villa, Liabilities of Bank and Thrift Counsel, in LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST THE
FDIC AND THE RTC 483, 493 (PLI Comm. Law & Litig. Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-666, 1993).
Attorney-directors appear "to be increasingly popular targets of lawsuits." See Gail Diane Cox, For Lawyers,
Lure of the Boardroom Has Its Perils: Serving on a Client's Board Can Lead to Conflicts that Could Get an
Attorney Fired or Sued. Will the ABA Ban the Role?, NAT'L. L.J., July 1, 1996, at B 1, B2 (attributing the "dearth
of case law" to the frequency of settlement because of the difficulty in defending conflict of interest claims
against attomey-directors).
65. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Conflict of Two Roles, NAT'L L. J., March 25, 1996, at A21-A22. An ABA
Litigation Section Task Force on the Independent Lawyer is examining the role of attorneys who serve as
counsel and director to client corporate entities. In connection with this study, Professor Susan R. Martyn of the
University of Toledo School of Law surveyed her school's alumni. The results indicate that 26.8% of the
respondents have served as directors of corporations, while only 9.3% note that they are currently serving as
corporate directors. Among the persons who currently serve as corporate directors, 40.5% practice as solo
practitioners. For a discussion of the results, see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyers as Directors: Who Serves and Why?,
in 22ND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, May 30-June 1, 1996, at Tab. 10.
66. For a thorough discussion of the ethical and liability problems created when an outside counsel serves in
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129 respondents (68%) indicated that their firms require prior approval or simply
prohibit principals serving as officers or directors of for-profit entities. The results
also show that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to monitor principals'
67directorship activities.
Evidently, firms are less concerned about exposure arising from their attorneys
serving on the Board of Directors of not-for-profit entities.68 Only 63 respondents
(33%) answered that their firms monitor principals serving as officers or directors
of not-for-profit entities. Firms may be less concerned about attorneys serving as
directors of nonprofit corporations because directors of such corporations have
less exposure than directors of for-profit corporations. 69
B. FIRM CONTROLS ON PRINCIPALS SERVING AS FIDUCIARIES AND ENTERING
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS
The results show that principals recognize their vulnerability when firm
attorneys hold fiduciary positions.70 A total of 103 respondents (54%) reported
that their firms require approval or prohibit principals from serving as trustees or
holding some other fiduciary position.71 A law firm's professional liability policy
the dual capacity of attorney-director, see Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETics 413 (1996). For a survey of the problems which arise when an outside counsel serves on the board
of directors of a client, see Block et al., supra note 62, at 3.
67. Eighty-five percent of the Large Firms (29 firms) monitor directorships, 72% of the Medium Firms (29
firms) monitor directorships, and 62% of Small Firms (64 firms) monitor principals serving as directors of
for-profit corporations.
68. See Ronald Chester, The Lawyer as Charitable Fiduciary: Public Trust or Private Gain?, 25 PAC. L.J.
1353 (1994) (analyzing the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty of attorneys who serve as directors or trustees of
charitable organizations).
69. This reaction mirrors the sentiments of some legal malpractice experts who believe that attorneys serving
on charitable boards face significantly less liability exposure than those serving on the boards of for-profit
entities. See Robert E. O'Malley & Harry H. Schneider, Danger: Lawyer on Board, 79 A.B.A. J., July 1993, at
102 (attributing heightened liability for service on for-profit corporations to the threat of shareholder derivative
suits). Although the standard of care applied to the performance by nonprofit directors of their duties generally
parallels the standard applied to directors of for-profit corporations, a number of states have enacted legislation
shielding uncompensated directors of charitable corporations from liability to third persons. DANIEL L. KuRiTZ,
BOARD LLBILrrY: GutE FOR NoNPRoFrr DIRECrORs 23, 99 (1988). E.g., Tax. Civ. PRAc. & RaM. CODE ANN.
§ 84.004 (West 1996) (providing that a "volunteer who is serving as an officer, director, or trustee of a charitable
organization is immune from civil liability for any act or omission resulting in death, damage, or injury if the
volunteer was acting in the course and scope of his duties or functions as an officer, director, or trustee within the
organization").
70. Attorneys' exposure varies depending on the nature of the fiduciary position. For a discussion of the
conflicts of interest created when an attorney serves as a testamentary fiduciary, see April A. Fegyveresi, Note,
Conflicts of Interests in Trust & Estate Practice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 987, 992-95 (1995). See also Edward J.
Boyle et al., Insurance Coverage for Attorneys, Accountants, and Insurance Brokers Serving as ERISA
Fiduciaries or Corporate Directors, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILrrY INSURANCE FOR ATrORNEYS, AccOuNTANTS,
AND INSURANCE BROKERS 481 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. H4-4992,
1986) (reviewing problems created when attorneys serve as fiduciaries under an employee benefit plan).
71. Because the survey did not ask respondents to describe the firm's areas of practice, the results do not
indicate whether firms with extensive trust and estate practice monitor or prohibit attorneys serving in fiduciary
positions. Firms with such a practice may permit attorneys to serve in such positions because fiduciary practice
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may cover claims arising out of trustee activities while specifically excluding
72claims relating to directorship activities. This may explain why a smaller
percentage of firms monitor attorneys serving in fiduciary positions than the
percentage of firms that monitor attorneys' activities as directors of for-profit
corporations.
The majority of the respondents also appreciate the risks involved when a firm
principal accepts stock or other investment interests in lieu of fees: 117 respon-
dents (61%) reported that their firms monitor principals acceptance of stock in
lieu of fees. In addition, 96 firms (50%) monitor firm principals investing in
business ventures with clients.73 Firms that have not instituted any such proce-
dures may not recognize the potential malpractice exposure resulting from
situations when attorneys enter into business transactions with clients. If such
investments are permitted, the firm and its attorneys are subject to legal
malpractice actions alleging conflicts of interest, negligence, and fraud.74 If the
firm is sued, the firm's legal malpractice policy may not provide coverage since
such policies commonly exclude claims relating to attorneys' business ven-
tures.
75
C. INTERNAL PROCEDURES AND EFFORTS TO MONITOR PRINCIPALS' COMPLIANCE
The majority of the respondents do not have procedures to monitor daily firm
affairs such as withdrawal of client funds. Surprisingly, only 67 respondents
(35%) require that two or more principals sign for withdrawals of client funds.
A series of questions asked whether the respondent's firm conducts periodic
reviews to determine their principals' compliance with various office procedures.
Responses indicate that firms are more likely to monitor compliance with office
procedures relating to firm finances than procedures relating to client representa-
tion matters. For example, 157 respondents (82%) reported that their firms
can result in a profit to the firm, depending on the amount of assets under management. For a discussion of the
economics of fiduciary practice, see William D. Haught, Task Force Continues Study on Attorneys in Fiduciary
Roles, 128 TRUSTS AND ESTATES, Apr. 1989, at 14, 16.
72. Volk et al., supra note 56, at 1571.
73. As expected, only a small fraction of the respondents (16 firms representing 8%) reported that their firms
monitor the personal investments of principals.
74. DENNIS HORAN & GEORGE W. SPELLmIRE, JR., THE AssociATEs' PREMIER FOR PREVENTION OF LEGAL
MALPRACnCE 4 (1987) (reporting on the results of hundreds of cases). For a discussion of the conflicts and traps
created when attorneys invest with clients, see E. Gregory Martin & Michael G. Martin, When Doing Deals is
Risky, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 80. Because courts will scrutinize business transactions with clients and presume
the transactions to be fraudulent unless proven otherwise, "lawyers who start out as investors in clients'
businesses could find themselves winding up as insurers." In addition to malpractice exposure, client
"[rlelationships can suffer, investment freedom can be compromised, and well-laid financial plans can become
muddled." Jon Newberry, Perilous Partnerships, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 106.
75. Jo ANN FELIX-RETZKE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 310 (1983) (explaining
the scope of the typical business pursuits exclusion).
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periodically review for compliance with billing procedures,76 while only 46
respondents (24%) reported that their firms monitor compliance with office
procedures related to seeking litigation sanctions. Other responses also indicate
that firms focus on compliance with procedures affecting firm finances and
profitability. Regarding the review of principals' compliance with office proce-
dures, 152 firms (80%) keep a watchful eye on accepting contingent fee cases and
123 (64%) monitor procedures relating to engagement letters and fee agreements.
Additional responses confirm that firms tend to be less concerned over matters
not directly affecting the "bottom line." For example, only 59 respondents (31%)
indicated that their firms monitor compliance with procedures relating to sending
"non-engagement" letters, slightly more (84 firms or 44%) do so in the case of
client screening procedures.77
Monitoring compliance with conflict of interest procedures is the strongest
example of a practice that deviates from the pattern among firms of focusing on
financial matters rather than client service matters. Reportedly, 144 firms (75%)
periodically review their principals' compliance with conflict of interest proce-
dures. 8 The national attention focused on conflict of interest problems probably
accounts for these results. 79 Law firm managers have learned that a conflict of
interest can only be identified if all of the firm's attorneys, including principals,
comply with the office procedures.8 °
D. OPINION LETTER PROCEDURES
Managing attorneys of large law firms should also appreciate the importance of
firm-wide guidelines and procedures for issuance of legal opinions. These
procedures provide quality control and reduce the firm's liability exposure for
opinion letters. By taking steps to avoid improvidently rendered opinions, law
firms may be able to avoid state disciplinary and regulatory actions, as well as
76. Most of the respondents from Large Firms (33 firms representing 94%) reported that their firms
periodically review principals' compliance with office procedures relating to billing.
77. Attorneys send "non-engagement letters" to nonclients to clarify and document the decision not to
represent a nonclient. These non-engagement letters should help to prevent recipients from incorrectly believing
or asserting that the attorney agreed to render legal services. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH,
PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACrICE § 211, at 114-15 (1989) (describing different approaches to non-engagement
letters).
78. Approximately 86% of the respondents in Large Firms reported that their firms periodically review
principal compliance with office procedures relating to conflicts of interest.
79. Commentators view conflicts of interest problems as the most pervasive and difficult problems that
practitioners face. For a comprehensive discussion of the conflicts of interest rules with illustrative cases, see
GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr §§ 1.7-1.19 (1996 Supp.).
80. Annually , firms must answer a questionnaire on legal malpractice insurance applications which asks for
a description of the firm's conflict of interest system. See LAWYERS' DESK GUIDE, supra note 14, at 187-88
(describing conflicts of interest procedures and other types of information that an applicant must describe in
detail in order to obtain legal malpractice coverage).
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civil and criminal liability.8t For example, by implementing good faith internal
procedures for rendering opinion letters, a firm may be able to defend against a
finding of scienter under the federal securities laws.82 In addition to providing
some assurance against claims, internal review procedures assist firms in devel-
oping uniform approaches to opinion matters, educate attorneys on relevant
developments, and provide a pool of experienced and knowledgeable attorneys
with whom difficult or novel issues may be discussed.83 Internal peer review
procedures for opinion letters may also insulate the attorney handling the
transaction against pressure from clients to give broad opinions and may shield
the attorney from unreasonable demands from attorneys on the other side of the
84transaction.
A firm's internal procedures depend on the nature of the firm's practice and
85composition. Larger firms may rely on committees to review opinions. This
approach enables committee members to enforce consistency and to develop an
expertise in rendering opimons. 86 Where a committee is not used, firms may
require that opinions be reviewed by one or more principals not involved in the
transaction who practice in the area of the law that is the subject of the opinion
letter.87
Although commentators and various bar committees highly recommend inter-
nal review procedures, 88 a majority of respondents do not require committee or
second principal review. Only 38 firms (20%) utilize committee approval of all
written opinions. A more frequently reported practice (in 66 firms or 35%) is that
81. See John P. Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 235, 235 -239
(1989) (explaining that an opinion could lead to a number of claims including claims based on negligent
malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, securities law violations, civil conspiracy, breach
of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a breach of duty, actions under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations statute, and penalties under the Internal Revenue Code).
82. Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transactions, 16 J. CORP. L. 375,408-9
(1991).
83. Richard H. Rowe, Law Firm Internal Opinion Review Procedures, in OPINIONs IN SEC TIRANSACrIONS
427,433 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 725, 1991).
84. ARNOLD S. JACOBS, OPINION LETrERS IN SEcuerrtEs TRANSAcrIONS, Intro. at 43 (1991).
85. Firms that handle a substantial amount of securities work should devote more attention to their internal
procedures and policies than firms that only render more traditional opinion letters.
86. JACOBS, supra note 84, at 43.
87. The Securities and Exchange Commission required such an approach in the settlement of the National
Student Marketing case against the firm of White & Case. The settlement required that the partner handling the
transaction consult with at least two other firm partners if faced with instances of possible client misconduct,
and that an experienced securities partner independently review certain registration statements and opinion
letters. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,027 (D.D.C. 1977).
88. See, e.g., Rice & Steinberg, supra note 82, at 440-41 (urging the use of internal review and standard
opinion forms to provide guidance and to avoid "reinventing the wheel"). Bar association sections have also
recommended internal procedures. See, e.g., Corp. & Banking Law Section, State Bar of Georgia, Report on
Legal Opinions to Third Parties in Corporate Transactions, in BusINESS OPeNONS 1992: THE USE AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABA ACCORD AND GuiDELINEs, at 142 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 774, 1992) (recommending that Georgia firms reduce their procedures to writing).
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written opinions be approved by two principals. And, 113 respondents (59%)
require a "standard approach" to legal opinion letters.
E. AUDIT RESPONSE PROCEDURES
A significant number of firms exercise additional precautions with regard to
audit opinion letters,89 a strategy encouraged by organized bar groups over the
past twenty years. In 1976, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the
ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditor's Requests
for Information (ABA Statement).9" The ABA Statement provides specific
guidelines for attorneys drafting audit responses and recommends a format for
responses to auditor's inquiries.91 Commentators recommend that firms follow
the ABA guidelines and adopt specific procedures, such as two partner review of
audit responses. 92 Firms testify to the benefits derived from utilizing second-
partner review procedures. For example, firms report that second-partner review
helps them insure that attorneys involved in a particular transaction possess the
appropriate expertise to provide an opinion and enables the firm to identify
situations where the opining partner has a potentially distracting personal
interest.93 A majority of the respondents (145 or 76%) reported that their firms
require principal approval of all audit opinion letters.94 The survey's results
indicate that a majority of the firms follow at least one element of the ABA's
guidelines for audit reply letters.
F. DESIGNATION OF IN-HOUSE ETHICS COUNSEL
In response to the explosion of legal malpractice awards, many finns have
89. Annually clients send their attorneys letters requesting that their attorneys provide information to
accountants auditing the clients' financial statements. The client letters inquire about certain types of matters
including loss contingencies, such as litigation claims and assessments to which the attorneys devoted
substantial attention. In response to the audit inquiries, the attorneys send "audit response letters" giving the
auditors information needed to form an opinion regarding the clients' financial statements. See John W. Allen &
Donald F. Tucker, Traps to Avoid When Drafting Auditor Response Letters, BRIEF, Spring 1993, at 48
(describing pitfalls attorneys should avoid in responding to audit inquiry letters).
90. The ABA Statement of Policy is reprinted at 31 Bus. LAW. 1709 (1976) and appears in the ABA SEcnON
OF CORpoRAToN, BANKING AND Bus'mEss LAW, CoMMrrrEE ON AuDrr INQUIRY REsPONSEs, AuDrrOR's LETER
HANDBOOK (1976).
91. Leland C. de la Garza, Auditor's Letter: Understanding and Responding to an Audit Inquiry Letter, TEX.
B.J., Jan. 1994, at 22-23.
92. See, e.g., Charles D. Lee, When Professionals Collide - Lawyers' Responses to Auditors'Requests, J.
KAN. B. A., Feb. 1992, at 27; Frederick D. Lipman, Responding to Auditors'Letters, LEGAL ECON., Oct. 1989, at
23 (outlining a variety of procedures that law firms should implement when responding to auditors).
93. For a description of various benefits described by large firms that are members of the Attorneys' Liability
Assurance Society, Inc., see Richard Rowe, Attorney's Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, in
OPINIONS IN SEC TRANsACrIONs Appendix B (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 725,
1991).
94. Another law firm study reflected concern over the handling of law firm audit responses. According to that
study, nearly every firm required that a partner sign an audit response. Volk et al., supra note 56, at 1574.
1996]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 10:271
appointed firm members to serve as ethics counsel or on ethics committees.95
Reportedly, the primary motivation behind the appointment of in-house ethics
counsel is the need to establish an attorney-client privilege with respect to
communications between firm members. 96 Unlike routine communications be-
tween firm attorneys, communications with ethics counsel should qualify for
protection under the attorney-client privilege when such communications have
been made for purpose of facilitating the rendering of legal services.97 Thus, the
designation of ethics counsel assists with any later claim of the attorney-client
privilege for communications between firm members and the ethics counsel
acting in a capacity as professional legal advisor.
98
Although the desire for confidentiality may have spurred firms to designate
ethics counsel, firms realize other practical benefits from designating an in-house
attorney as ethics counsel. 99 First, ethics counsel can develop the requisite
expertise to handle ethics problems.1t° Appointment of ethics counsel helps the
firm meet its responsibilities under a state's version of Model Rule 5.1, requiring
that partners make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with the Model Rules
by members of the firm, including other firm principals.'0 1 An ethics counsel or
committee can also serve in an ombudsman capacity by providing neutral advice
and assistance when firm attorneys face ethical dilemmas. By appointing an
ombudsman, the firm signals to insiders and outsiders its commitment to creating
95. For a discussion of the general counsel movement among law firms, see Daniel B. Kennedy, New Trend
is General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 29.
96. See Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like Their Clients, to
Look Inside for Advice, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A l (referring to accounts from firms that have joined the
"general counsel bandwagon"). See infra Section IV.B.3 for a discussion of the confidentiality of intra-firm
communications.
97. Although the attorney-client privilege applies when an attorney seeks legal advice from another attorney,
it does not apply to a person when a person seeks business advice or speaks to an attorney merely as a friend. See
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., TiE LAW AND ETrics OF LAWYERING 223 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that
'legal advice' turns on the intent of the client in making the communication").
98. A person who seeks legal advice from an attorney may invoke an unqualified privilege not to testify
concerning the contents of a confidential communication that was made by the client or the client's agent to the
attorney or the attorney's agent, unless the protection is waived. CHARLES L. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs
§ 6.3.1, at 251 (1986) (referring to the Wigmorian conception of the attorney-client privilege which is the best
known formulation of the privilege).
99. For a discussion of the external and internal reasons for appointing an ethics committee and guidelines
for implementing an ethics committee, see Jonathan M. Epstein, Comment, The In-House Ethics Advisor:
Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1011, 1013-38 (1994).
100. Legal ethics has evolved as a substantive area of law. As explained by one commentator, "[t]he
collection of rules that goes by the name of 'legal ethics' is every bit as much a subject-matter area of law as
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, federal income taxation or litigation. As a matter of self-
preservation ... [n]o competent firm should treat ethics differently." Peter R. Jarvis, Ethics Advisers Watch
Over Firms, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 15.
101. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(a). Although the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct [hereinafter
Texas Rules] are based on the Model Rules, the Texas Rules do not include the provisions of Model Rule 5.1(a).
TEXAs RULE 5.01 (1995).
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a high moral climate within the law firm. 10 2 As explained by Professor Charles
Wolfram, "[A] law firm that assumes some collaborative responsibility for the
moral climate of the firm's practice can improve morale, the quality of work, and
perhaps, the moral standards of the firm's lawyers and other employees." Io3
The survey results reflect that Texas firms have participated in the national
trend to appoint in-house counsel. The majority of respondents (73%) indicated
their firms have an appointed principal or committee to handle ethics or
malpractice problems. Interestingly, only 117 firms (61%) have a principal or
committee assigned to handle risk management'0 " and quality assurance.' 0 5 The
results indicate that firms may be more inclined to designate individuals to handle
ethics problems once they arise rather than rely on risk managers who might be
able to take steps to avoid problems before they arise.1°6 The results also suggest
that the larger firms are more likely than the smaller firms to appont a principal in
the firm or a committee to handle ethics and risk management matters.107
G. VEHICLES FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION ON PEERS
Approximately half of the respondents report that their law firm sections and
departments engage in some peer review, though predominately on an informal
basis.10 8 Some informal peer review occurs at section or department meetings. A
total of 95 respondents (50%) reported that department heads or section leaders
conduct regular meetings. where participants discuss the principals' as well as
associates' work.
102. See Epstein, supra note 99, at 1030-3 1.
103. WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 16.2.1, at 881 (referring to commentators' observations on institutional
responsibility). In his seminal piece advocating law firm discipline, Professor Ted Schneyer emphasizes the
importance of institutional responsibility in developing a firm's organization, policies, and operating procedures
as the firm's "ethical infrastructure." Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 10-11 (1991).
104. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 16 (1995) ("Risk manage-
ment is the establishment of institutional, i.e., firm- or practice-wide policies, procedures, or systems sometimes
referred to as risk-management 'tools' designed to minimize risk within the firm and its practice.").
105. With increased competition for clients, more firms may utilize quality assurance managers. Ronald
Mallen, the dean of legal malpractice, predicted that in ten years quality assurance managers in law firms will be
"as common as firm administrators are now." Stephen G. Hirsch, At Long & Levitt, Quality is Job One, AM.
LAw., Dec. 23, 1991, at 2.
106. See William H. Fortune & Dulaney O'Roark, Risk Management for Lawyers, 45 S.C. L. REV. 617,
626-35 (1994) (contrasting "proactive risk management" with "reactive risk management" which occurs after
malpractice claims arise).
107. All Large Firms (n=35) have designated a principal to handle ethics or malpractice problems. The
percentage goes down to 87% for Medium Firms and to 60% for Small Firms. The responses to the question that
asks whether the firm has designated a principal to handle risk management and quality assurance matters
reflects a similar pattern. Approximately 86% of Large Firms have done so, while only 70% of Medium Firms
have designated such a principal. Only 52% of Small Firms have designated such a principal.
108. While only 35 respondents (18%) indicated that the principals within the same section formally review
one another, 97 respondents (51%) reported that department heads or section leaders monitor the progress of all
matters in their sections.
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In response to a general question regarding peer review programs, 65 respon-
dents (34%) noted that their firms designate a principal or committee to evaluate
the manner in which principals handle client matters. 10 9 At the same time, only 20
firms (10%) employ formal procedures for reviewing the work of principals,
other than a review conducted in connection with compensation decisions. These
responses indicate that while 65 firms (34%) have taken the first step of
designating a person or committee to evaluate principals' work, less than one
third of that number (20 firms) have actually adopted formal procedures for such
review. As expected, these results show that the review of principals is largely
completed on an informal basis by managing partners or management commit-
tees.
Eighteen respondents described their firm's peer review procedures for review-
ing the work of principals. These descriptions also indicate that most peer review
procedures are conducted informally, often within sections or departments."'
Two respondents stated that principals in the firm regularly review one another.
Firm meetings also provide an opportunity for firm principals to conduct
informal reviews of other principals' work. One respondent reported that the firm
recently implemented a peer review program whereby principals review all other
principals and each principal obtains a summary of the other principals' com-
ments.
According to the survey responses, firm principals tend to rely more on the
feedback from firm attorneys than from clients. When asked about the sources of
information on their principals' performance, 106 respondents (55%) reported
that they seek information exclusively from the firm's other principals while 69
firms (36%) also obtain information from firm associates. Only 58 firms (30%)
solicit information from clients.l"1 The number of firms who formally seek client
feedback should increase as firms compete more aggressively for clients and,
accordingly, take measures to improve client satisfaction.1
12
Survey responses indicate a relationship between firm size and a law firms
reliance on its principals reviewing each other.113 The results also reveal that
109. The responses to this question also indicate that as firms grow, they adopt more formal management
structures. About half of Large Firms (17 firms) have designated a principal or committee to evaluate the
manner in which principals handle client matters. This percentage decreases to 43% in Medium Firms (17 firms)
and further decreases to 26% in Small Firms (27 firms).
110. Of the 18 respondents who described their firms' peer review programs, four indicated that section or
department chairs monitored performance and/or conducted section meetings.
11. The results indicate that Small Firms and Medium Firms tend to seek client feedback more than Large
Firms.
112. In a national survey of law firms' marketing strategies, 34.4% of the 128 participating firms reported
that their firms formally audit client satisfaction. See Larry Smith, TQM Engine Gathers No Steam, According to
OF COUNSEL Marketing Survey, OF CouiNsEL, Dec. 6-20, 1993, at 1.
113. A total of 22 respondents from Large Firms (65%) reported that their firms formally sought feedback on
principal performance from other principals; 22 respondents from Medium Firms (55%) reported that their
firms formally sought feedback from other principals; and only 54 respondents from Small Firms (52%) relied
on principals' feedback.
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smaller firms tend to solicit associate feedback more frequently than larger
fins. 114
As expected, the survey results confirm that the larger the firm, the more likely
it is to be more bureaucratic, imposing more controls on the conduct of
principals. Of the thirty-four questions relating to peer review measures, the
responses to twenty-seven questions indicate a relationship between a firm's size
and the implementation of formal peer review measures. Obviously, principals in
smaller firms can more easily rely on informal mechanisms to evaluate one
another." 5 As firms expand, these principals cannot rely on informal measures
alone, but need to institute more formal procedures.
III. ATTITUDES ON PEER REvIEw
The questionnaire sought information on respondents' attitudes on peer review.
One question asked the respondents to identify the advantages of peer review. As
illustrated in Table 3, respondents identified advantages benefitting the firm as
well as the firm's clients. A smaller number of respondents identified specific
advantages of peer review procedures that affect a firm's culture, such as
intra-firm communication and team-building, as shown below.
TABLE 3
ADVANTAGES OF PEER REVIEW
NUMBER OF
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
ADVANTAGES CHECKED RESPONDENTS (TOTAL N = 191)
Controls liability losses 69% 131
Improves the quality of legal services 68% 129
Identifies principals with problems affecting
performance 60% 114
Prevents principals from becoming too autono-
mous 51% 98
Avoids disciplinary violations 49% 93
Boosts intrafirm communication 45% 85
Helps shape attitudes that the firm is a team 44% 84
Serves marketing purposes 22% 42
114. A total of 40 respondents from Small Firms (39%) indicated that they sought feedback on principals
performance by asking associates. In the category of Medium Firms, 15 respondents (38%) indicated that their
firms sought associate feedback. In the Large Firms, only 21% of the respondents (7 firms) reported that their
firms sought associate feedback on principals' performance.
115. One survey respondent expresses this sentiment in the following comment:
In a small firm such as ours, our 'peer review' and control come in many ways, all of which are
informal. In a small firm, where there is good communication, the principals each know on a fairly
regular basis what the other principals are doing and whether their clients are happy with their
representation or not.
19961
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
As indicated in Table 3, only 22% of respondents believe peer review serves
marketing purposes. Respondents whose firms utilize formal peer review proce-
dures mark this advantage more often than other advantages.' 16 These responses
indicate that firms sometimes employ formal peer review procedures to impress
clients.
Firms might strengthen their peer review measures if they believe that
principals have a duty to monitor their peers. Respondents tended to reject the
notion that principals have a legal duty to monitor one another. Slightly over half
of the respondents (55%) indicated that principals have an ethical duty to monitor
other principals' handling of client matters.117 By comparison, only 40% of the
respondents believe that principals have a legal duty to perform the same
review.'t 8 This attitude may help explain why more firms have not instituted
formal peer review procedures. It is likely that more firms would implement peer
review measures if the firm's principals believe that they have a legal duty to
monitor their peers.
IV. OBSTACLES TO PEER REVIEW
The study indicates that perceived obstacles deter or prevent firms from
formalizing their peer review procedures. A number of respondents question the
advisability and feasibility of peer review. There appear to be two major obstacles
to implementing peer review: (1) concern for the autonomy of law firm principals
and resistance to the concept of peer review and (2) administrative burdens of
peer review.
A. PRiNCIPAL AUTONOMY
Attorneys may resist peer review if they believe that any review of principals'
work and performance interferes with the attorneys' autonomy. As explained by
one commentator, peer review "arouses fear and loathing in many lawyers and
firms" because it challenges individuality and the "cottage industry structure of
most large law firms." " 9
116. Of the 42 respondents whose firms designate a person or committee to evaluate the manner in which
principals handle client matters, 18 (43%) believe that peer review advances marketing.
117. Presumably, the number of respondents who believe that principals have an ethical duty to monitor their
peers would be greater if the Texas Rules imposed such a duty. See supra note 101. Unlike Model Rule 5.1(a),
the Texas Rules do not require a partner to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm implements measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct. MODEL
RuLEs Rule 5.1 (a).
118. Only 17 respondents (9%) "strongly agreed" with the statement that firm principals have a legal duty to
monitor the manner in which other firm principals handle client matters. A larger percentage (12%) "strongly
agreed" with the statement that firm principals have an ethical duty to monitor the manner in which other
principals handle client matters.
119. Anthony E. Davis, The Long Term Implications of the Kaye, Scholer Case for Law Firm
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In identifying the disadvantages of peer review, 60 respondents (31%) indi-
cated that they believe peer review impinges upon the autonomy of individual
principals. Additionally, 35 (18%) note that peer review interferes with personal
client relationships.
Further analysis of these responses reveals differences between attitudes of the
respondents whose firms have formalized peer review procedures compared with
those whose firms have not. Of the 60 respondents who believe that peer review
impinges on autonomy, 55 (92%) practice in firms with no formal peer review
procedures to monitor the manner in which principals practice. By contrast, only
5 (8%) of the respondents who believe that peer review impinges on principals'
autonomy practice in firms with formal peer review measures. 120 Attorneys who
practice in firms that have not implemented peer review may be more likely to
perceive peer review as a threat to attorney autonomy than attorneys who practice
in firms that have implemented formal peer review measures. Finally, of those
respondents who cited the disadvantages of peer review, the highest number (136
respondents or 71%) noted that they believe that peer review can create ill will
and resentment among principals. Concern about possible discord resulting from
peer review may therefore be a significant barrier to implementing formal review
procedures.
Attorneys who believe that peer review impinges on their autonomy appar-
ently view such autonomy as the ability to serve clients without interference from
third parties, including other firm principals. Autonomy is perceived to be at odds
with on-going accountability to their colleagues. 121 Professional autonomy tends
to be "an ambiguous concept that has been defined in various, inconsistent
ways." 122 If autonomy is defined as control over how work is performed and
evaluated, then peer review does indeed restrict independence. On the other hand,
peer review does not impinge on an attorney's independence if professional
autonomy refers to the ability of law firms to function as "a buffer between the
illegitimate desires of ... clients and the societal interest." 123 This professional
Management - Risk Management Comes ofAge, 35 S. TX. L. REV. 677, 692 (1994) (recommending that firms
implement some level of peer review as part of their risk management program).
120. The responses to other questions reflect a similar pattern. For example, 31 (89%) of the 35 respondents
who believe that peer review interferes with client relationships practice in firms with no formal peer review.
The percentage of respondents who believe that peer review interferes with personal client relationships goes
down to 11% for respondents who practice in firms with formal peer review measures other than review
conducted in connection with compensation decisions.
121. See Robert O'Malley, Lawyer Liability: How to Keep It From Exploding, 16 SPG. BRIEF 15, 16 (1987),
available in WESTLAw (warning that the environment of "rugged individualism" where partners are "virtually
autonomous" often threatens law firm stability).
122. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, & Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relation-
ships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1985) (footnote omitted). For an analysis of different
perspectives of professional independence, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 6-30 (1988).
123. ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 342 (1964) (quoting TALCOT" PARSONS, THE LAW &
SOCIOLOGY 69 (W. Evan ed.. 1962)).
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autonomy enables firm attorneys to exercise independent judgment, free from
outside influences. Using this conceptualization, peer review does not threaten
professional autonomy.
If firm principals function as a team, attorneys perceive clients as "firm
clients" rather than clients belonging to the individual principal. 24 If a firm
engages in peer review to improve the delivery of its legal services to firm clients,
then peer review does not encroach on principals' turf. Rather, peer review "may
provide a stronger basis for independence, on the assumption that remaining
competent and effective - for individuals and organizations - requires an
occasional dose of disinterested advice and constructive criticism." '
25
B. ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES
I. DEFINING STANDARDS FOR PEER REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
Even if firm principals recognize that peer review does not threaten their
autonomy, some still question the feasibility of peer review, given the nature of
law practice and high degree of legal specialization. 126 Others do not believe that
peer review is possible, perceiving law as "more of an art than a science." 1
27
These critics do not believe that peer review standards can be developed. 128
Of the survey's respondents, 78 (41%) believed that attorneys cannot agree on
standards for evaluating legal competence. ' 29 In comparing the legal profession
to other professions that have instituted peer review measures, 41 respondents
124. One respondent differentiated "firm clients" in describing the following disadvantage to peer review:
"Inconsistent, in fact antithetical, to a professional relationship between an attorney and his client assuming the
client is not a 'firm' client."
125. See ALI-ABA COMM. ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF
LAWYERS app. c, at 535 (1981) (posing the discussion question of whether law practice peer review has any
future in a legal profession notorious for its strong ideological commitment to independence of the practitioner).
126. See Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 MINN. L. REV. 697,703-04 (1988)
(suggesting that under the traditional model of an attorney as an autonomous professional, the degree of
discretion involved in attorneys handling daily tasks and ambiguous matters makes it difficult for attorneys to
monitor each other).
127. WILLIAMSBURG REPORT, supra note 17, at 327 (quoting a conference participant who differentiated other
professions like accounting, medicine, and engineering which are more "sciences than arts").
128. Although skeptics do not believe that standards of legal competence can be established, the American
Law Institute-American Bar Association ("ALI-ABA") Committee on Continuing Professional Education
attempted to do so in defining the "Criteria of Attorney Competence." ALI-ABA COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF.
EDUC., A MODEL PEER REvIEw SYSTEM, at 11-26 (Discussion Draft Apr. 1, 1980). In defining competence, the
Model System stresses six qualities to be considered: knowledge, skills, practice management, awareness of the
clients' needs, self-awareness, and capability. Id. at 11. In 1992, ALI-ABA also published a series of checklists
that an attorney or law firm can use to assess performance and abilities. ALI-ABA COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF.
EDUC., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE N THE PRACTICE OF LAW, at 249-309 (1992). Risk
management experts have also created various checklists and questionnaires to be used in law firm self-audits.
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 104, at 121.
129. Among this group, 9% (18 respondents) "strongly agreed" with the statement that lawyers cannot agree
on standards for evaluating lawyer competence.
ARE LAW FIRM PARTNERS ISLANDS UNTO THEMSELVES?
(21%) strongly agreed with the statement that "[u]nlike accounting or medicine,
lawyering skills cannot be easily evaluated or monitored." Similarly, 46 respon-
dents (24%) agreed that principals cannot evaluate the substantive knowledge
and competence of other principals due to the high degree of legal specialization.
About one half of the respondents (92 firms or 48%) also agreed that principals
can only be effectively monitored by principals in the same area of legal
practice. 1
30
These views may assume that peer review involves "second guessing"
substantive decisions made by principals. If a peer review program is limited to a
"technical standards" review, however, the fact that principals specialize in
different areas of the law should not pose an obstacle to peer review.' 31 Similarly,
specialization among principals may not affect principal review programs based
on associate feedback or client audits.
Individuals who insist that principals cannot assess the performance of other
principals seem to ignore the fact that firm principals regularly critique and
evaluate associates' work. t 32 Evidently, they believe that when associates gradu-
ate into partner ranks, that some transformation occurs, hampering the ability to
evaluate partner performance.
Some critics oppose peer review, arguing that it will impose unnecessary
burdens and costs on busy practitioners, resulting in unnecessary over-
lawyering. 133 A total of 84 respondents (44%) indicated that they believe that
peer review will take too much time away from billable practice. Law firms
should, therefore, design programs that minimize the "burden, delay and ex-
130. A study conducted by The Wall Street Journal indicates that even experts practicing in the same area of
the law differ in their judgments on the same legal problem. In this study, a reporter posed as a man selling his
home and needing review of a sophisticated sales contract. After the reporter consulted lawyers at six legal
clinics and two traditional law firms, a panel of three experts reviewed the advice rendered to the reporter. The
experts concluded that none of the attorneys identified all the defects in the contract. Moreover, the experts
themselves could not agree on all their judgments. Hal Lancaster, If Your Legal Problems Are Complex, a Clinic
May Not Be the Answer, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1980, at Al. This study reveals that even experts in the same area
differ on their substantive evaluation and recommendations.
131. With "technical standards review" firm members develop and review compliance with certain
procedural standards designed to improve the overall quality, delivery, and profitability of work produced.
Technical Standards Checklist for Partner Review, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 15, 1990, at 11. For example, the
designated firm members could review selected client files for general organization, existence of executed fee
agreements, existence of conflicts information on new case memoranda, and other facts identified on the
checklist. Id. (providing a specimen checklist for technical standards review). For a description of one firm's
approach to reviewing files to determine if the reviewed partner has complied with clearly defined technical
standards, see Fortney, supra note 23, at 366-67.
132. MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 54, § 2.31, at 204-05 (noting that nearly every firm engages in some form
of associate review). Typically, partners review associates working under the partners' supervision or working
in the partners' section.
133. As explained by one respondent, "Good attorneys have barely got time to properly care for their own
clients.... The idea of routinely double-checking a competent attorney's work is stupid, cost prohibitive and
only effective as an appearance activity."
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pense, [while] maximiz[ing] the potential for a good quality assurance pro-
gram." 134
2. UTILIZING PEER REVIEW RESULTS
In designing peer review programs, firms must determine how to handle the
results of the peer review process. Specifically, the firm's principals must decide
whether peer review will affect compensation packages of those reviewed. Some
firms intentionally conduct peer review at a time other than compensation
evaluation time. 1 35 Other firms consider peer review results in making compensa-
tion decisions. 
36
In the survey, 123 respondents (64%) indicated that peer review should be
conducted at a time other than concurrently with an evaluation of compensa-
tion. "'37 This preference was expressed in the responses received from law firms
ranging in size from the largest to the smallest without any apparent relationship
between the responses and the size of the firm.138 Respondents from firms
organized as general partnerships appear to be the most concerned about
separating peer review process from any evaluation of compensation. 39 Attor-
neys may perceive that peer review is less threatening if dissociated from the
compensation process.14
0
3. DISCOVERY PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE PRIVILEGES
A plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit against a firm and its attorneys may seek
peer review communications unless they are privileged. A written report showing
that a firm considers one of its attorneys to be deficient in knowledge or skill can
134. Corrigan, supra note 54, at 62. For practical suggestions on implementing and administering a peer
review program, see Joel A. Rose, The Trouble with Harry ... Dealing with the Problem Partner, in THE
QUALrY PURSurr (Robert Greene ed., 1989) (recommending procedures, policies, and forms).
135. For example, the Denver-based firm of Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson keeps peer review
separate from compensation decisions in order to promote "honesty and openness." Scott Graham, Four
Divergent Approaches to Peer Review, RECORDER, May 24, 1991, at 5.
136. The Los Angeles-based firm of Latham & Watkins uses the review in allocating bonuses. Id.
137. Another 25 (13%) indicated that peer review should be conducted at the same time as compensation
review time, 27 (14%) indicated that no peer review should be conducted, and 16 (8%) did not answer the
question.
138. Presumably, principals in larger firms would express more concern about connecting peer review to
compensation decisions because principals in larger firms tend to earn more than principals in smaller firms. See
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 194, 201 (1989) (referring to numerous studies which confirm the
relationship between firm size and partnership income).
139. Seven out of eight respondents who practice in general partnership firms believe that peer review should
be conducted at a time other than compensation review time.
140. See Ward Bower, Game Plan for Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 82, 84 (suggesting that firms could
overcome reluctance to peer review if peer review was "purely constructive in nature," and not connected to
compensation).
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severely damage the firm's defense of a malpractice claim. 1 ' If the plaintiff
learns that a peer review or risk management program revealed an internal
problem that the firm failed to remedy, the plaintiff could obtain punitive
damages.1 42 The failure to remedy a problem could also adversely affect the
firm's ability to obtain legal malpractice insurance if insurance underwriters gain
access to peer review information. 
143
Understandably, attorneys expressed concern over the possibility that peer
review results may be obtained by third parties; 13 respondents (7%) indicated
that their firms do not engage in formal peer review because the results might be
discoverable. Moreover, 68 respondents (36%) indicated that their firms would
be more likely to institute peer review measures if peer review communications
were protected from discovery. A total of 164 respondents (86%) believed that
peer review should be afforded confidentiality so that third parties cannot
discover the results of peer review.
Discoverability of peer review results hinges on whether the firm had a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 144 The answer to this question depends
on a number of factors including who conducted the review and who had access
to the results. 145 Depending on the answers to these questions, the attorney-client
privilege may protect firm communications.
APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Whether the person who directed or conducted the peer review was acting in a
legal capacity may enable the firm to rely on the attorney-client privilege. The
privilege may apply if the person who initiated peer review acted as the firm's
legal counsel. A firm may retain outside counsel or may designate an in-house
attorney to serve as the firm's general counsel or ethics counsel. 
1 46
The desire of firms to protect intra-firm communications has motivated a
141. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 2.31, at 205.
142. In seeking punitive damages, the plaintiff could argue that the firm partners acted with reckless
disregard in failing to remedy a problem of which they had notice.
143. See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of
Lawyers, 61 'ItMLE L. REV. 1211, 1227 (1988) (referring to a statement characterizing peer review as "one
excellent, broad, and very hard club in the hands of insurance underwriters").
144. See Patricia Wilson, Law Firm Management Reviews: Damned If You Do; Damned it You Don't
(undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (analyzing the confidentiality issues associated with
law firm risk management audits).
145. Other issues relate to: (1) the person who requested the audit; (2) the date of the alleged malpractice; (3)
whether the firm complied with audit recommendations; (4) the reason why evidence of the audit is being
offered; and (5) applicable statutes and regulations. Id.
146. If a firm does not possess in-house expertise to handle ethics and malpractice matters, the firm should
"make advance arrangements with outside counsel who can help address such matters on a timely, effective
basis." Jarvis, supra note 100, at 17.
1996]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
number of firms to create a position of in-house general counsel. 147 The
Attorneys Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a malpractice mutual insurance
company funded by some 350 of the country's largest law firms, spearheaded this
national movement by encouraging its member firms to designate loss-prevention
counsel.148 Robert O'Malley, chairman of ALAS, believes that communications
between the firm members and their officially-appointed counsel should enjoy
protection under the attorney-client privilege. 
149
Although the attorney-client privilege based on intra-firm communication
privilege is a largely untested idea, two courts have recognized that the attorney-
client privilege may apply. In re Sunrise Securities Litigation examined this
question in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.'5 The federal district court held
that the attorney-client privilege may apply to communications between attor-
neys within a law firm when the attorney who gives the advice acts as in-house
counsel to the law firm.15' To establish that the privilege applies, the law firm
must satisfy the traditional test for the attorney-client privilege.1 52 Specifically,
the firm must show that:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by the client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal'services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.
153
In addition to satisfying the traditional requirements for establishing the
attorney-client privilege, the Sunrise Securities court stated that the law firm
consultation with in-house counsel must not create a conflict of interest between
the law firm's fiduciary duties to itself and its duties to the client seeking to
147. See Kennedy, supra note 95, at 29 (generally discussing the risk of the attorney-client privilege not
being upheld).
148. For a discussion of the responsibilities and experiences of the loss control partners in ALAS firms, see
Larry Smith, Firms Relying on Loss Control Partners for Internal Surveillance, OF COUNSEL, Feb. 19, 1990, at
3.
149. Taylor, supra note 96, at A22; see also Amy Boardman, Firms'Answer to Outside Pressures: In-House
GCs, TEx. LAW., June 6, 1994, at 1, 38 (quoting a general counsel of a Texas firm who stated that his designation
as general counsel would probably help from an evidentiary standpoint if the firm invokes the attorney-client
privilege).
150. In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting the attorney-client privilege test set forth in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass 1950) and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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discover the communications. 54 Applying this rule, the court limited the attorney-
client privilege to those documents that did not contain communications or legal
advice in which the firm's representation of itself conflicted with its representa-
tion of the client seeking the documents.1 5  Therefore, following the Sunrise
Securities rationale, the attorney-client privilege may not apply when communi-
cations directly relate to the client who is seeking discovery. Conversely, when
the communication does not directly relate to the client or former client seeking
discovery, the attorney-client privilege should protect the peer review communi-
cations.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Rowe l5 6 extended the attorney-client
privilege to cover an internal firm investigation conducted by law firm associates.
Charles E. Rowe, the firm's managing partner, asked two associates to investigate
possible mishandling of client funds by Walter Lee McElravy, the firm's chief
financial officer.' 57 When a federal grand jury investigating McElravy subpoe-
naed the associates seeking information on their conversations with Rowe, Rowe
asserted the attorney-client privilege.1 58 Finding that Rowe had not established
the attorney-client privilege, the district judge ordered the associates to testify. 
159
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege applied to the
confidential communications between Rowe and the associates, who effectively
acted as in-house counsel.' 60 According to the court, a firm member should "not
be stripped of privilege because the hiring of the professional was conve-
nient." 
1 6 1
154. The court reasoned that when events cause firm attorneys to seek advice of the firm's in-house counsel,
the advice may hinder the firm's representation of the client, creating a conflict of interest between the firm and
the client. Sunrise Securities, 130 F.R.D. at 595-97.
155. If Client B seeks to discover communications relating to Client A, no conflict arises between the firm
and Client B with respect to the communications relating to Client A. Because no conflict arises, the firm should
be able to shield the communications from Client B provided that the other elements of attorney-client privilege
exist.
156. 96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
157. Rowe also asked that the California State Bar take "appropriate action" against McElravy. Id. at 1295.
158. While the privilege question was pending, McElravy was sentenced to a 46-month prison term after
pleading guilty to embezzling $850,000 from various client accounts. Gail Diane Cox, Court Expands Client
Privilege, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at A6.
159. After interviewing the associates in camera, the district judge explained that "the associates were never
told they were working as the firm's attorneys; that they didn't bill the firm or record hours expended on the
firm's behalf; and that, because they were far less experienced than Rowe, '[t]hey were certainly taking
direction from him.' "96 F.3d at 1296.
160. As noted by the court, the existence of the privilege does not turn on whether counsel functions as
in-house counsel or outside counsel. Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein et al., 2 WEiNsTEIN's EVIDENCE
503(a)(2)[01] at 503-30 (1996)).
161. 96 F.3d at 1297. In rejecting the government's argument that the attorney-client privilege did not apply
because the associates were engaged in fact-finding, the court also concluded that the attorney-client privilege
does not distinguish between fact-finding and lawyering. Id. at 1296-97 (criticizing commentators who suggest
that investigative work does not qualify as "professional legal services"). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case
for consideration of the government's final arguments that the crime/fraud exception and waiver defeat the
privilege. Id. at 1297-98.
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The Rowe opinion can be cited in arguing that the attorney-client privilege
shields internal firm communications made to facilitate the rendition of legal
services by one firm attorney to another.' 62 Still, the protection provided under
Rowe may not reach routine peer review communications, when a firm member is
not actually consulting another attorney in connection with a legal problem. 1
63
APPLICATION OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE
Given that firms cannot always use the attorney-client privilege to shield
communications from discovery, firms may attempt to rely on other protections
provided under common law, including the self-critical analysis privilege. 6" The
Federal Rules of Evidence require that privileges "be governed by principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience." 165 Citing this authority, some courts have
recognized a self-critical analysis privilege against the disclosure of information
developed or produced during the course of certain internal corporate proceed-
ings. 166 Such a privilege serves societal interests by enabling a party's employees
and representatives to engage in critical analysis and evaluation of the party's
conduct "unfettered by the fear that the comments may be discoverable and used
adversely.' 67 Because disclosure would detrimentally affect candid analysis,
confidentiality must be preserved to maintain the objectivity necessary for
meaningful self-critical analysis.' 68 The self-critical analysis privilege centers
162. Because the person seeking information in Rowe was the government rather than a client, the Rowe
opinion does not address the potential conflict of interest that may arise when a client seeks information that
pertains to the client from a firm. When such a conflict arises, the attorney-client privilege does not apply under
the reasoning used in the Sunrise Securities case. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
163. Although ethics experts should welcome the Rowe decision, one has already expressed reservations
about the court's reasoning. See, e.g., Cornelia Wallis Honchar, Law Firm's Internal Investigation Gets Sticky,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 8 1996, at 6 (recommending that firms hire outside counsel to avoid the question of
whether the attorney-client privilege applies).
164. Some commentators and courts refer to the "self-evaluative privilege." See, e.g., Nancy C. Crisman &
Arthur F. Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Internal
Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 123
(1983) (tracing the evolution of the self-evaluative privilege).
165. FED. R. EvID. 501. States' evidence rules contain provisions which parallel Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., COLO. R. ElOv. 501.
166. See, e.g., Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993).
167. Michael J. Holland, The Self-Analysis Privilege: Obscuring the Truth but Safeguarding Improvement?,
25 FALL BRIEF 52 (1995), available in WEsTLAW. Without protection, self-investigative audits and evaluations
can provide a "valuable 'road map' to persons who want to show" a pattern of disregard or negligence.
Jo-Christy Brown & Kelly A. MacDonald, Texas Audit Privilege, STATE BAR SECTION REPORT: HEALTH LAW,
Autumn 1996, at 6 (explaining that the Texas Environmental Health and Safety Audit Privilege Act encourages
businesses to conduct health and safety compliance audits and correct problems because it eliminates the fear
that audit documents will be subject to discovery).
168. As stated by one commentator, "[w]ithout confidentiality there will be a loss of candor." James E
Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 551, 563 (1983).
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around confidentiality and pits the need for truth in litigation against the value of
confidentiality in obtaining complete and candid reports. 169 To encourage critical
self-evaluation, some courts have employed the self-critical analysis privilege
"to protect certain information from discovery particularly where public policy
outweighs the needs of litigants and the judicial system for access to information
relevant to the litigation." 170
A federal district court in the District of Columbia first recognized the
self-critical analysis privilege in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.17 1 In Bredice, a
medical malpractice plaintiff sought discovery of medical peer review communi-
cations. 172 The court denied discovery on the basis that absent "extraordinary
circumstances," the communications of medical staff committees should be
protected. 173 The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the confidenti-
ality of internal proceedings explaining:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and
these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and
treatment of patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices
is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and
deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional
necessity would result in terminating such deliberations. Constructive profes-
sional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one
doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleagues' conduct in a
malpractice suit.' 
74
On the basis of the "overwhelming public interest" served by confidentiality, the
court applied a qualified privilege to the committee's internal communica-
tions. 175
Shortly after the Bredice decision, another federal district court in Banks v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co. 176 applied the self-critical analysis privilege to an employ-
ment discrimination case. In Banks, the court denied the plaintiff's request for
production of internal material prepared by the employer's equal employment
opportunity team. Because the team was charged with studying the company's
169. See John F. X. Peloso, The Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis: Protecting the Public by Protecting the
Confidentiality ofInternal Investigations in the Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 229, 230 (1990) (focusing
on the dilemma posed to government or private parties by required organizational self-audits).
170. Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 166 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
171. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
172. The plaintiff requested production of reports and minutes of any board or committee meetings
concerning the death of Frank Bredice. The hospital objected to the production of the minutes and reports of the
peer review meeting where the death was discussed because the objective of such a meeting was the
improvement of patient care and treatment through self-analysis. 50 F.R.D. at 249-50.
173. Id. at 251. As noted by the court, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals requires that
accredited hospitals rely on medical peer review committees. Id. at 250.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 251.
176. 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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internal problems, the court concluded that disclosure would discourage compa-
nies from making efforts that would positively affect employment practices.
Following the lead of the Bredice court, the Banks court focused on the public
policy of encouraging companies to review their own conduct and to undertake
socially desirable action.'
77
Following Bredice and Banks, courts have recognized the self-critical analysis
privilege in different contexts including antitrust, t7 8 product safety,t 7 9 securi-
ties, 8° and environmental law 1 81 cases. Courts have identified four prerequisites
that must be satisfied before applying the privilege:
1. The critical self-analysis must have been undertaken by the parties seeking
protection;
2. The public must possess a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the
type of information sought;
3. The information must be of the type that its free flow would be curtailed if
discovery were allowed; and
4. Any document produced must have been prepared with the expectation of
confidentiality and the confidentiality must, in fact, have been maintained. '
82
Applying these criteria, a self-critical analysis privilege should protect law
firm peer review communications. First, law firm peer review communications
are generated as part of a process for monitoring conduct and detecting internal
problems. Second, clients and non-clients alike possess a strong interest in law
177. See Edward Brodsky, Self-Critical Analysis, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 3 (suggesting that the
self-critical analysis privilege be applied in a corporate context so that companies will not be discouraged from
undertaking socially desirable action).
178. See, e.g., Cameron v. New Hanover Mem'l. Hosp., 293 S.E.2d 901, 915 (N.C. App. 1983) (minutes of
hospital committee meetings privileged as "good faith" communications where "those present had a
corresponding interest in the administration of the hospital").
179. See, e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (information communicated by
corporate deponent to Consumer Product Safety Commission was privileged, but only where it contained
critical self-analysis).
180. In re Crazy Eddie's Sec. Lit., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-206 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (relying on the self-evaluative
privilege to protect the accounting firm's peer review report and internal review of the firm's audit work). But
see In re Salomon Inc. Sec. Lit., No. 91-CIV. 5442, 1992 WL 350762 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1992) (allowing
private litigants to discover the broker-dealer's internal reports created in connection with the broker's
compliance efforts).
181. See, e.g., Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ha. 1994) (landowner entitled to
privilege for self-critical reports analyzing past conduct and resulting environmental consequences).
182. A 1983 note in the Harvard Law Review articulated the first three criteria for the privilege derived from
court opinions. Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1086 (1983). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit added the fourth prerequisite in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises Inc., 971
F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992). Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly adopt the privilege, it did state that
any such privilege does not protect routine internal reviews of safety matters before the problem arises.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between investigation conducted before and after a problem arises.
According to the court, those investigations conducted before a problem arises are not conducted with the
expectation that they will remain confidential. Id.
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firm peer review which promises to improve the quality of legal services. Third,
any possible disclosure of peer review communications threatens uninhibited
self-analysis and evaluation. Finally, law firms can satisfy the fourth prerequisite
by taking steps to preserve the confidentiality of peer review communications.
For example, the law firm could appoint a peer review partner to oversee the
process. This partner could educate participants on confidentiality issues, includ-
ing how to avoid waiver by disclosure to third parties such as malpractice
insurers.
Although a law firm might try to rely on a self-critical analysis privilege, its
uncertainty overshadows its utility.'8 3 The majority of state courts 8 4 and most
federal courts refuse to adopt a common law peer review privilege.1 85 In the
context of academic peer review proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
recognize a federal common law privilege against disclosure. '
8 6
The reluctance of most courts to adopt a common law peer review privilege
may have led legislators to enact statutes to protect and encourage medical peer
review. 187 At least forty-six states now have laws to protect medical peer review
activities."s Congress expressed its support of professional peer review activities
by enacting the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 18 9
183. See Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, Securities Litigation: The Self-Evaluative Privilege and
Beyond, CIO ALI-ABA 423, ORGANIZING FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: TOWARD STANDARDS (1995) (explain-
ing that uncertainty relates to inability to predict whether a court will recognize the privilege and whether the
qualified privilege must yield to accommodate the plaintiffs' needs). The protection that the privilege provides
the private litigant will depend on "the nature of the claim, the forum in which it is litigated and the provisions
of state law." Thomas F. O'Neil HI & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primer for
Health Care Lawyers, 5 ANNALS HEALTH 33, 44 (1996).
184. Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey,
67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 191 (1988).
185. Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review Information:
More Imagined Than Real, 7 J. HEALTH & L. 169, 182-83 (1992-93).
186. In University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), the
Supreme Court declined to exercise its authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to recognize a privilege in
an area where "it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided
the privilege itself." 493 U.S. at 189.
187. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 185, at 170-71. In 1991 the United States Sentencing Commission's
adoption of Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations sparked a renewed interest in the creation of a statutory
basis for the self-evaluative privilege. Lawrence J. Zweifack, Internal Corporate Investigations, in SECURrrTES
LITIGATION 531 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 905, 1991). These guidelines provide
an incentive for companies to conduct internal investigations in response to allegations or evidence of
wrongdoing and to implement compliance. To encourage internal investigations, at least fourteen states have
enacted environmental audit protection statutes, and Maryland has extended a self-evaluation privilege for the
records of compliance review committees in banks. Joseph E. Murphy & Ilise L. Feitshans, Protecting the
Compliance Audit, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 667, 677-78 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 943, 1996).
188. For an analysis of the various approaches used by states, see Creech, supra note 184, at 182-89.
189. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (West Supp. 1994). HCQIA statutorily grants antitrust immunity to
medical peer review participants when the review conforms to the standards articulated in HCQIA. For a
discussion of the HCQIA provisions, see Jeanne Darricades, Comment, Medical Peer Review: How Is It
Protected by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986?, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 263 (1992). HCQIA only
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Thus, federal and state legislation affords some protection to peer review
communications and participants, thus encouraging and promoting medical peer
review.' 90 By the same logic, legislators should extend protection to the legal
profession to encourage attorneys to engage in self-critical analysis in law firms
and law offices.' 9'
A few states have already enacted legislation to protect certain risk manage-
ment activities conducted by organized state bar groups. For example, the
following Louisiana statute provides immunity and confidentiality not to Louisi-
ana law firms, but to persons involved in the state bar's risk management program
to protect those individuals from being forced to reveal information obtained as a
result of the program:
Any past or present loss prevention counsel functioning as such in the position
approved by the Board of Governors of the Louisiana State Bar Association,
Louisiana State Bar Association committee member, staff member, or person
receiving information from such counsel, committee member, or staff member
who has been involved in any loss prevention program, shall not be required to
report any acts or disclose any information concerning the acts or omissions of
a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association received during, or in
connection with, loss prevention activities. Such counsel, committee member,
and staff member shall be privileged and immune from any suit, claim,
demand, court order, action, proceedings, or discovery request brought in
connection with loss prevention duties or activities performed for any Louisi-
ana State Bar Association member. 
192
North Carolina utilizes a different approach by amending its disciplinary rules
for attorneys. The definition of "confidential information" in Rule 4 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct includes "information received by a
lawyer then acting as an agent of a lawyers' or judges' assistance program
provides limited protection from discovery by restricting access to certain information that peer review
counittees report. Id. at 278.
190. Legislators have also encouraged accounting peer review by protecting communications made in
connection with quality review programs. For example, the Texas Public Accountancy Act of 1991, section 15B
established a quality review program and provides that reports, opinions, and papers formulated in connection
with quality review or peer review are "privileged and may not be subject to discovery, subpoena, or other
means of legal compulsion for release to any person except the [Texas Board of Public Accountancy] and [are]
not admissible as evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding except for a board hearing." TEx. REv.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-l, § 15B(c) (West Supp. 1996).
191. Opponents of the self-evaluative privilege insist that it undermines the ability to discover truth in
litigation by enabling parties to conceal evidence. See Joseph E. Murphy, The Self-Evaluative Privilege, 7 J.
CoRP. L. 489, 495 (1982) (examining the common-law privilege within the context of corporate communica-
tions, and proposing two statutory alternatives). This criticism, which can be leveled against other discovery
privileges, ignores the salutary effects of internal review and the limited scope of the self-evaluative privilege.
Although self-policing can occur regardless of potential discovery, the self-evaluative privilege promotes the
objectivity necessary for critical evaluations. See Flanagan, supra note 168, at 563 (referring to peer review in
medical, academic, and other professional organizations).
192. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:220 (West 1995).
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approved by the North Carolina State Bar or the North Carolina Supreme Court
regarding another lawyer or judge seeking assistance." 193 This rule enables the
North Carolina Lawyers Management Assistance Program (LMAP) to conduct
confidential in-house audits.' 94 Because the rule treats information acquired
about attorney conduct as confidential, LMAP attorneys do not have a duty to
report professional misconduct to disciplinary authorities. 95
Model Rule 8.3 takes a similar approach to exempt attorneys from the
mandatory reporting of information gained while serving as members of lawyers'
assistance programs. 196 As explained by the Comments to the Model Rules,
confidentiality encourages attorneys and judges to seek assistance through
association assistance programs. 197 The Model Rule provisions recognize that the
success of such programs depends on maintaining confidentiality. To encourage
internal peer review and assistance, similar protection should be afforded to
internal law firm peer review programs.
Until the time that legislatures or courts provide such protection, law firms
must carefully approach peer review in a way to obtain the highest degree of
confidentiality.' 98 Firm managers should determine what protection may be
available under applicable disciplinary rules and statutes. Thereafter, each firm
193. N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 4 (1995). Lawyers' assistance programs for impaired
attorneys now exist in every state. Michael J. Crowley, Alcoholic Lawyers: Are they Being Coddled by Attorney
Discipline Systems?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 39. These lawyers' assistance programs operate as confidential
referral, prevention, intervention, and education resources, stressing both confidentiality and separation from
the attorney discipline systems. Patricia Sue Heil, Tending the Bar in Texas: Alcoholism as a Mitigating Factor
in Attorney Discipline, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1263, 1284-5 (1993). These programs use trained professionals and
volunteers to provide guidance and support to impaired attorneys who are referred to the program. In this sense,
the lawyers assistance programs provide a type of external peer assistance which can be differentiated from
internal peer review measures implemented by law firms. If law firm peer review reveals or suggests attorney
impairment, firm managers could refer the impaired attorney to a lawyers' assistance program. For a practical
guide to "managing lawyer impairment," see Paula A. Barran, Professional Responsibility and Law Firm
Management: Managing Lawyer Impairment, ABA 22ND NATIONAL CoNFERENcE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BiIrrY, May 30-June 1, 1996, at Tab. 2.
194. Following the audit, attorneys receive an evaluation of their management practices and recommenda-
tions without fear of discovery. See Alice Neece Mosely, Nancy Byerly Jones: Leading the Way for the Law
Practice Program, N.C. ST. BAR Q., Summer 1993, at 22-23 (interview with the director of the law practice
assistance program and risk management counsel for the North Carolina State Bar).
195. Under North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3, the duty to report does not apply to
confidential information. N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 1.3(c) (1995).
196. Model Rule 8.3(a) requires lawyers to report professional misconduct when they possess "knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." MODEL RULES Rule
8.3(a). Subsection (c) of the rule provides an exception for information protected under the confidentiality rule
and information gained when a lawyer is serving as a member of an approved lawyers assistance program.
MODEL RULES Rule 8.3(c). Compare TExAs RULES Rule 8.03(c) (enabling attorneys to report professional
misconduct to an approved peer assistance program, rather than to the disciplinary authorities, when the
reporting attorney believes that another attorney is "impaired by chemical dependency on alcohol or drugs or by
mental illness").
197. MODEL RULES Rule 8.3 cmt 5.
198. For example, peer review could be conducted by law firms' general counsel or ethics counsel.
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must formulate a policy relating to the creation and retention of records related to
peer review.199
V. FIRM CULTURE AND PEER REVIEW
As the survey results illustrate, principals' willingness to seriously consider
peer review and implement peer review measures depends to a large extent on
firm culture. Despite the amorphous nature of firm culture, many commentators
have discussed the role that culture plays in law firms. In his recent book
Professor Michael Kelly asserts that "culture or house norms.., play a dominant
role in the way a lawyer practices.", 200 Anthony T. Kronman, Dean of Yale Law
School, explains that "culture" refers to "the attitudes and interests that the
members of a group share and that define, for them, the point or purpose of their
participation in it.",
2 0 1
Law firm management consultants view culture as the philosophical foun-
dation supporting the relationships among the attorneys, the working environ-
ment, firm governance, and practice management. 20 2 As the firm's philosophical
foundation, culture determines a number of aspects of firm practice.
Various survey questions elicited the respondents' philosophies on the follow-
ing:
(1) whether the firm's principals take an institutional approach and function
as a team or whether they operate as a group of practitioners sharing office
space ("confederation approach"),
(2) the degree of autonomy individual principals enjoy and the extent to
which they are accountable to other principals for the management of their
individual practices, and
(3) the extent to which clients "belong" to the firm or to the individual
attorneys.
20 3
199. Because malpractice plaintiffs may attempt to discover peer review communications, some com-
mentators recommend that firms not retain any documentation. For example, Robert O'Malley, loss preven-
tion counsel for ALAS, cautions firms not to "leave a paper trail." Martha Middleton, Are Firms Ready for
Peer Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1987, at 1, 10. In the absence of documentation, plaintiffs could still at-
tempt to obtain the information through deposition testimony. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 2.31, at
205.
200. In a recent book, Professor Kelly uses stories to show how culture acts as a crucial determinant of the
quality of professional life. MICHAEL KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE
18 (1994).
201. ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 291 (1993) (discussing the radical changes in the character
of law firms' internal cultures).
202. Gerry Malone, What Is This Thing Called Law Firm Culture?, in LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT 515 (PLI
Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 478, 1988). Malone suggests that the ultimate success or
failure of the law firm turns on its firm culture. Id.
203. For a discussion of the importance of these perspectives in considering a possible merger, see GERRY
MALONE & HOWARD MUDRICK, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 11-12 (1992).
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A. DO PRINCIPALS HAVE A TEAM OR CONFEDERATION PERSPECTIVE?
Law firm management experts resoundingly recommend that firm principals
cultivate a team mentality among the firm's attorneys and staff.2° In a team
culture, attorneys elevate the firm's interests above individual interests.
The survey responses indicate that the majority of the respondents appreciate
the importance of functioning as a unit rather than a confederation of individual
practitioners. A total of 112 respondents (59%) agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement that a firm should stress interdependence of principals. About the same
percentage (61% or 116 of the respondents) believed that attorneys in a law firm
should operate as a single entity in representing clients.2 °5
Surprisingly, a number of respondents did express a confederation perspective.
Thirty-six respondents (19%) stated that firm attorneys should not operate as a
single entity in representing clients and 25 respondents (13%) believed that a firm
should not stress the interdependence of principals. Only 17 respondents (9%)
agreed that a law firm merely exists to facilitate each attorney's practice by
providing assistance such as support staff, library resources, and insurance
coverage.2°6
Survey responses indicate that attorneys whose responses reflect the confedera-
tion perspective are more likely to practice in firms that have not implemented
peer review measures. Two questions relating to opinion letter procedures
illustrate this pattern. Of the 25 respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement, "[a] firm should stress the interdependence of principals," 21
(84%) practice in firms that do not require committee approval of all written
opinions. Sixteen respondents (64%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed with
the statement practice in firms that do not require two principal approval of all
written opinions.
B. ARE PRINCIPALS ACCOUNTABLE TO OTHER PRINCIPALS?
Other responses indicate a similar connection between cultural attitudes and
the extent to which principals practice autonomously from one another. Approxi-
204. E.g., Ward Bower, What Kind of Firm Will Yours Be?, L. PRAC. MGMT., March 1990, at 40 (noting that
"a team approach to law practice generally facilitates specialization, effective client service, backup, internal
referral and delegation, leverage, and increased profitability"). Ward Bower, a principal with the consulting firm
of Altman & Weil, has written various pieces distinguishing "team" and "confederation" firms. See also
ALTMAN & WEtL, supra note 26.
205. Although the results do not suggest a connection between firm size and the percentage of respondents
who believed that firms' principals should operate as a single entity in representing clients, the results do
indicate that the percentage of respondents who believe that firms should stress interdependence of principals
increases as the firm size increases.
206. Of this group, only two respondents "strongly agreed" that a law firms exists merely to facilitate each
lawyer's practice by providing assistance such as support staff, library resources and insurance coverage. No
respondents from Large Firms agreed with the statement that firms exist merely to facilitate each lawyer's
practice.
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mately 88% of the 32 respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with the
statement, "[e]ach principal as a master of his/her own craft should be permitted
to practice with little or no supervision from other firm principals," practice in
firms with no formal peer review measures for reviewing principals' work.
'Among the 30 respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with the assertion that
each principal as a master of his/her own craft should be permitted to practice
with little or no supervision from other firm principals, 25 (83%) practice in firms
that have not adopted procedures for monitoring principals who work outside
207their area. Perhaps this reflects the view that principals operate as a confedera-
tion of individuals who tolerate the "inconvenience of practicing together
[because it] improves an individual's financial return." 
208
C. ARE CLIENTS ATTRACTED TO INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALS OR TO FIRMS?
In the confederation organizational culture, principals emphasize their per-
sonal relationships with their clients. By contrast, in a team culture, principals
view clients as "firm clients" rather than clients who "belong" to individual
attorneys.209
Attorneys who believe that clients hire individual attorneys and not law firms
may perceive clients as "belonging" to the originating attorney. A slight majority
of the respondents (54% or 103) believe clients hire individual attorneys and not
law firms .21o Among respondents who believed that clients hire individual
attorneys, 89% practice in firms that have not instituted formal procedures for the
review of the work of principals. 21' This suggests that principals may not
implement peer review measures when they believe that clients hire individual
attorneys rather than firms.2 12 As firm loyalty wanes,213 attorneys may be more
inclined to see clients as their personal clients in whom they have sole proprietary
207. The results reflect a similar connection between attitudes and the adoption of procedures to monitor
principals working outside their area. Eighty-two percent of those respondents who agreed or strongly agreed
with the statement that "[law firms merely exist to facilitate each lawyer's practice," work in firms that have
not adopted procedures for monitoring principals who work outside their areas of practice.
208. See KELLY, supra note 200, at 186-87 (contrasting a finn that functions as a community with a firm that
operates as a group of individuals).
209. Management in a team firm disperses responsibility for clients throughout the firm rather than vesting
responsibility in the hands of an individual principal. Id. at 193.
210. Among this group of 103, 84 respondents (82%) agreed that clients hire individual attorneys and not
law firms while 19 (18%) strongly agreed with the statement.
211. Presumably, attorneys in the largest firms would be more likely to believe that clients are attracted by
firm reputation. The survey reveals no such relationship between firm size and the belief that clients hire
individual attorneys and not law firms.
212. For a discussion of the factors that have caused a "loosening" of the internal and external bonds that
have linked firm members and their clients, see KRONMAN, supra note 201, at 277-78.
213. See John F. Sutton, Jr., Lawyers Today: Wise Professionals or Mere Skill Technicians?, 35 S. TEx. L.
REv. 741, 745 (1994) (reviewing ANTHoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LosT LAWYER (1993)) (describing the conse-
quences of client loyalty "toppling" and clients shopping among firms).
[Vol. 10:271
ARE LAW FIRM PARTNERS ISLANDS UNTO THEMSELVES?
interest. 214 These attitudes undermine law firm solidarity and the sense of a
firm-wide team.21 5
VI. CONCLUSION - RESHAPING FIRM CULTURE
In surveying peer review measures and attitudes on law firm practice and
partner accountability, the study examined how firm principals conduct them-
selves once they band together in law firms and how they perceive their
relationships with their peers. Although the concept of law firm peer review may
appear to be novel, the study revealed that firms are in fact engaging in some
forms of peer review. Most firms reported periodically monitoring principals'
compliance with procedures relating to firm finances, but devoted less vigilance
to procedures related to client service. Some firms heed the warnings of
malpractice experts and institute controls to deal with problems such as conflicts
of interest and attorneys' service as members of boards of directors of for-profit
corporations. Yet, peer review tends to be conducted informally, predominately
within law firm sections or departments. A large percentage of respondents
recognize one or more advantages of peer review procedures, so one might
expect to find a high number of firms with formal procedures. Respondents,
however, perceive countervailing disadvantages and obstacles to peer review.
Some obstacles can be addressed by persons outside the law firm. For example,
state legislators can provide protection of peer review communications from
discovery in any subsequent litigation. In an effort to encourage quality control
and risk management, malpractice insurers could allow a premium discount for
law firm peer review programs.216
Successful implementation of peer review ultimately turns on attitudes and
structures within law firms. The study results indicate that attorneys who share an
institutional perspective are more likely to implement peer review measures than
attorneys who function as a confederation of individual practitioners. It may be
that firms can only overcome resistance to peer review by "cultivating a collegial
atmosphere wherein quality is revered to the point that partner autonomy
becomes secondary to the recognized benefits of quality enhancement." 217 In this
process, attorneys should recognize the advantages of functioning as a team,
214. See BRADFORD W. HILDEBRANDT & JACK KAUFMAN, THE SuccEsSFUL LAW FIRM: NEW APPROACHES TO
STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT 10 (1988) (reporting that in recent years more clients have shifted to hiring
lawyers, not law firms).
215. See Joan Wagner Zinober, Improving Partner Relationships, L. PRAC. MGmT., Mar. 1990, at 24-25
(emphasizing that treatment of clients as firm clients rather than private clients of an individual attorney
differentiates attorneys who practice as a team from those who simply share overhead).
216. According to the survey results, 94 respondents (49%) indicated that their firms would institute peer
review if legal malpractice insurers provide a premium discount for peer review. Of that group, 57 respondents
(30%) noted a numerical value for the desired discount. The amount of premium discount that respondents
noted varied from 3% to 30%, with an average of 13%.
217. Corrigan, supra note 54, at 62.
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rather than a group of individuals. When a firm stresses a team approach,
principals may view interdependence "in a positive, community light, rather than
as a policing function.
' 2 18
Law firm management consultants encourage such an institutional approach,
insisting that it "results in a more economically successful firm as well as a more
pleasant working environment.", 2t9 As explained by management consultants,
"cultivating the right culture" where attorneys talk about "we" rather than
"me," harvests success. 221 Some go so far as to warn that failure to re-engineer
firm culture results in the extinction of the firm.
221
These consultants do not believe that culture should be left to chance; rather
they recommend that firm leaders take steps to shape a positive culture where
peer review is only one aspect of quality control and client service.222 First, firm
leaders should examine their own attitudes relating to firm practice, client
service, and principal accountability. As explained by Professor Robert Nelson,
"professional values related to organizational policies arise inside the firm and
reflect the managerial ideology of the elite in power."' 223 Because professional-
ism within a firm is constructed according to the firm's particular history and
interests of its powerful partners,224 implementation of successful peer review
measures will turn on whether the firm's leaders support the effort.
Assuming the firm's leaders reach some consensus on the need for peer review
measures, these individuals must then determine the best vehicle for exploring
the matter with the remainder of the firm.225 Firm leaders may appoint a task
force to study the matter or could devote a retreat to discussing the principals'
views of firm practice.226
218. Brian W. Smith & M. Lindsay Childress, Avoiding Lawyer Liability in the Wake ofKaye, Scholer, 8 ST.
Jo~tN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 385, 401 (1993).
219. Malone, supra note 202, at 517.
220. Susan Hightower & Brenda Sapino, Cultural Evolution, Thx. LAW., Jan. 22, 1996, at 1, 18.
221. See, e.g., Ronald M. Martin, The Empowered Firm, in TOTAL QuALrrY MANAGEMENT FOR LAW FIRMS
1993: TURNING AWARENESS INTO ACTION 101 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 664,
1993) (arguing that attorneys must work "smarter" and more efficiently in order to thrive); see also Hightower
& Sapino, supra note 220, at 18 (suggesting that a "deficient corporate culture" struck the death blow for
Johnson & Wortley, one of the largest firms in Texas).
222. See Bower, supra note 204, at 40 (listing a number of choices a firm must make in order to define itself).
For recommendations from firm leaders who want to take steps to change their firms' cultures to be
client-centered and compatible with the current buyers' market, see F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The
Buyer's Market and the Need for Law Firm Leadership, Creativity and Innovations, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 147,
184-187 (1994).
223. This conclusion is based on the findings of a study of four large Chicago law firms, two with
bureaucratic structures and two without such structures. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE
SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 220 (1988) (emphisis omitted).
224. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 25, at 207.
225. See Scott Hunter, Alignment: The X Factor of Success, TEx. LAW., Apr. 15, 1996, at 33 (discussing the
importance of firm principals possessing a vision and aligning individual goals in a team effort).
226. For guidance on organizing a retreat where short and long term goals can be explored, see Stephen
Weinstein, Planning a Law Firm Retreat, 7 PRAc. LAW. 15 (1993); see also Joel A. Rose, The Changing Nature
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When a firm's principals aspire to build and maintain a team, the principals
must change firm structures that undermine team culture. For example, the firm
might want to alter a compensation system that gives substantial credit for
origination of new legal business.22 7 Instead, firms could emphasize collective
marketing rather than the individualistic, entrepreneurial "eat what you kill"
approach.2 28 Shifting the approach can help law firms avoid ethical and morale
problems created when firms emphasize business development.
229
As the firm's principals change the firm's structures and their attitudes on firm
practice they should become more receptive to the implementation of a risk
management program requiring some peer review measures.2 3 ° Principals may
come to realize that they must surrender some independence for the overall
benefit of the firm.2 3'
Principals must then tailor peer review procedures to the firm's individual
circumstances and the principals' perspectives.232 Depending on the size of the
law firm, its principals may designate individuals or committees to deal with
particular problem areas.23 3 Once the objectives, scope, and type of review are
identified, firm management can propose procedures for principals' approval.
The principals should also be consulted on administrative matters including
decisions on the use and documentation of peer review results. Thereafter, firm
of the Firm's Culture, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 1995, at 5 (recommending firms use questionnaires to identify issues
and assess attitudes in preparation for firm retreats).
227. See Duncan C. Smith, Total Quality Leadership, L. PRAC. MGMT., March 1993 at 34 (recommending
that firms' compensation systems and methods of governance reinforce team building). For an account of the
experience of a large Texas firm which has abandoned the "eat what you kill" philosophy and adopted a more
comprehensive scheme that includes production and origination as well as community service, pro bono work,
teamwork, and management contributions, see Amy Boardman, High Risk Strategy Pays Offfor Gardere, Thx.
LAW., April 10, 1995, at 1, 31.
228. See Hightower & Sapino, supra note 220, at 19 (suggesting that firms aggressively compete for
business while maintaining "a level of professionalism and collegiality"); see also Eric Milstone, Slicing the
Pie, A.B.A. J., April 1996, at 26 (describing the slow movement in law firms to consider attorneys' total
contributions in tailoring compensation plans to match firms' long-term goals).
229. As recognized by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the "eat what you kill" system can lead to ethical difficulties.
William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 155 (1987). Recognizing the problems
with such an approach, many firms have moved away from a mechanistic approach of rewarding business
development. See Larry Smith, Firms De-emphasize Rigid Formulas for Rainmaking, OF COuNsEL, Nov. 19,
1990, at 4.
230. See Middleton, supra note 199, at 1, 10 (reporting that negative attitudes toward peer review are
changing). As stated by Robert O'Malley of ALAS, partners "see the handwriting on the wall .... They have
too many claims, too many liabilities and too many embarrassing incidents that could have been prevented if
individual partners had less autonomy and individual authority." Id.
231. See John Hurley, In Search of the New Paradigm: Total Quality Management in the Law Firm -A Case
Study, 43 EMORY L. J. 521, 536 (1994) (discussing the importance of lawyers surrendering some status and
prerogative in connection with a Total Quality Management program).
232. See Bradford W. Hildebrandt, Managing in a Recession, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1990, at 4 (emphasizing the
importance of customizing peer review to the specific law firm).
233. For identification of various committees to handle dangerous situations and causes of legal malpractice
claims, see Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REv. 325, 361-63
(1989).
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leaders should assume significant responsibility to ensure that attorneys meet
firm standards and comply with firm policies.234
In monitoring the manner in which attorneys handle client matters, technical
standards review promises to be the type of peer review that will encounter the
least resistance from principals. By adopting standards, firms may condition
principals to accept more intrusive peer review measures by creating an environ-
ment of accountability.
In this context, accountability encompasses both individual and corporate
dimensions.235 On the individual level, firm attorneys must take responsibility for
the manner in which they practice law. Understanding that their acts and
omissions may subject the firm and the other firm members to liability and
possible damage to their reputations, firm members should be willing to partici-
pate in peer review. On both an individual and corporate level, attorneys and their
firms are accountable to the legal profession for maintaining the highest ethical
standards.2 3 6 Finally, law firms and the legal profession must be held accountable
for assuring that the system of self-regulation protects the public. Such account-
ability may earn the public trust by demonstrating that firm attorneys are
dedicated to keeping their own houses clean.
234. Bradford W. Hildebrandt, The Role of Practice Management, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 1992, at 4. All firm
attorneys must then make good faith efforts to follow adopted policies and procedures because failure to follow
policies and procedures can give rise to liability. See Baxter, supra note 18, at 211-12 (explaining that
accounting firms have learned a painful lesson that failure to follow practice manuals can generate malpractice
suits).
235. See PAUL Y. ERTEL & M. GENE ALDRIDGE, MEDICAL PEER REVIEW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 386-87 (1977)
(analyzing the different aspects of public and professional accountability within the context of medical peer
review).
236. See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 700-01 (1994) (urging
that organizations employing attorneys substantially increase ethical conduct through "monitoring and reward
structures" because research on corporate compliance structures reveals that internal methods of securing
compliance work more effectively than external oversight structures).
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APPENDIX-QUESTIONNAIRE
Professor Susan Fortney of Texas Tech University is conducting a study of law
firm culture and peer review measures in Texas law firms. A grant from the Texas
Bar Foundation partially funded the expenses of this survey.
As a managing attorney your response is important to reflect accurately
attitudes and approaches in Texas finns. Please take 5-10 minutes to complete the
attached survey to provide information and to register your opinions.
For the purpose of this survey "peer review" means the process in which law
firm partners or principals monitor and evaluate the job performance of their
colleagues. The term "principal" is used to denote any equity holder in a law firm
including a member of a partnership and shareholder in a corporation.
This survey does not intend to suggest standards or practices that should be
followed.
When you have completed the survey, please send the survey in the enclosed
envelope and separately mail the attached postcard. The postcard will be used to
send survey results to persons completing the survey.
PLEASE RESPOND BY AUGUST 1, 1995.
DO NOT INDICATE YOUR FIRM NAME.
YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE ANONYMOUS.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.
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INSTRUCTIONS: MOST OFTHESE QUESTIONS CAN BE COMPLETED BY EITHER CHECKING A RESPONSE OR BY
FILLING IN A BLANK. IF A QUESTION SEEMS INAPPROPRIATELY OR INCOMPLETELY STATED FOR YOUR SITUATION,
FEEL FREE TO WRITE AN EXPLANATION IN THE MARGINS OR ON THE ENCLOSED COMMENT SHEET.
What Is the size of your firm Including all branch offices?
More than 50 attorneys
26 to 50 attorneys
10 to 25 attorneys
2 to 9 attorneys





Do withdrawals of client funds require the signature of
two principals?
Yes No
Does your firm require
Committee approval of all written opinions?
Yes_ No
Two principal approval of all written opinions?
Yes- No
Principal approval of all audit letter responses?
Yes_ No_
A standard approach to legal opinion letters?
Yes_ No
Does your firm have a principal or committee designated
to
Handle ethics or malpractice problems?
Yes- No
Handle risk management and quality assurance?
Yes_ No
Evaluate the manner in which principals handle client
matters?
Yes No
Does your firm participate In "cold review" whereby an
attorney not connected with a client matter reviews
facts and circumstances of certain matters such as
litigation filings and securities offerings?
Yes No
Does your firm have procedures to monitor the
following activities by firm principals?
Investing in business transactions with clients
Yes No
Other personal investments of principals
Yes No




Principals' outside speaking and writing engagements
Yes No
Principals serving as expert witnesses
Yes No
Does the firm require approval or prohibit principals
serving as
Officers or Directors of for profit entities?
Yes No
Officers or Directors of not-for-profit entities?
Yes No
Trustees or holding some other fiduciary position?
Yes No
Does your firm have procedures relating to
Periodic physical examination of principals?
Yes No
Principals working outside their area of practice?
Yes No
Do principals within the same section formally review one
another?
Yes No
Do department heads or section leaders
Conduct regular meetings where principals' work as
well as associates' work is discussed?
Yes __ No-
Monitor the progress of all matters in a section?
Yes __ No
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Does your firm conduct a periodic review to determine If






















Accepting contingent tee cases
Yes No
Do firm managers formally seek feedback on a
principal's performance by asking the following
persons for Information?
Clients Yes __ No __
Associates Yes __ No __
Other principals Yes __ No-
Other than the review conducted In connection with
compensation decisions, does your firm have any
formal procedures for reviewing the work of principals?
Yes No
It 'yes", please describe briefly your procedure. It
"no", skip to the next section.
WE ARE INTERESTED IN YOUR
OPINIONS REGARDING PEER REVIEW.
Which of the following do you Identify as an advantage
of peer review? Please check all advantages you see.




Identifies principals with problems
affecting performance
Serves marketing purposes
Helps shape attitudes that the
firm is a team
Prevents principals from becoming
too autonomous
Which of the following do you Identify as a
disadvantage of peer review?
Please check all disadvantages you see.
Peer review interferes with personal client
relationships.
Peer review impinges upon the autonomy of
individual principals.
Peer review will take too much time away from
billable practice.
Peer review can create ill will and resentment
among partners.
Describe other disadvantages
Should peer review be conducted at a time other than
compensation review time?
Yes No_
if no formal review should be conducted, check
here




By both outside consultants
and firm insiders
It no formal review should be
conducted, check here
Should law firm peer review be afforded confidentiality
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If your firm does not have any formal peer review
measures, answer the following questions, otherwise,
skip to the next section.
a. Does your firm not engage In formal peer
review because Its results might be
discoverable?
Yes No
b. Would your firm be more likely to Institute peer
review measures If peer review communica-
tions were protected from discovery?
Yes __ No
c. Would your firm Institute peer review measures
If legal malpractice insurers provided a
premium discount of
(complete a percentage, e.g. 5%)
- (check here if no discount would
cause your firm to institute peer
review)
DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENTS?
USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO INDICATE YOUR
OPINION BY PLACING A NUMBER IN BLANK.
1 2 3 4 5
STRONGLY DISAGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
Clients retain a law firm expecting that firm principals
monitor the performance of individual attorneys.
- Firm principals should make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has measures giving reasonable
assurance that the conduct of all attorneys conforms
to applicable ethical rules.
- Firm principals have a legal duty to monitor the
manner in which other firm principals handle client
matters.
Firm principals have an ethical duty to monitor the
manner in which other firm principals handle client
matters.
__ Unlimited liability provides an incentive for attorneys
to monitor the conduct of one another.
Firms should monitor principals to control liability and
to protect firm assets including its reputation.
- Regardless of the structure of a firm, all firm principals
should be subject to civil liability for injuries caused
by any wrongful act or omission of any firm principal.
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1 2 4 5
STRONGLY DISAGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
Vicarious liability should not be imposed on all firm
principals because injured persons can be
compensated by insurance and other firm assets.
- If firm principals inquire into another principal's work,
they will lose any liability shield provided by the PC,
LLC or LLP structure.
Lawyers cannot agree on standards for evaluating
legal competence.
Due to the high degree of legal specialization
principals can't evaluate the substantive
knowledge and competence of other principals.
Principals can only be effectively monitored by
principals practicing in the same area.
Unlike accounting or medicine, lawyering skills cannot
be easily evaluated or monitored.
A firm should stress the interdependence of
principals.
- Firm attorneys should operate as a single entity in
representing clients.
Each principal as a master of his/her own craft should
be permitted to practice with little or no supervision
from other firm principals.
Law firms exist merely to facilitate each lawyers
practice by providing assistance such as support staff,
library resources and insurance coverage.
Clients hire individual attorneys not law firms.
- Lack of supervision is the main characteristic
distinguishing a principal from an associate.
Clients should not be billed for time devoted to
monitoring.
Peer review among partners is not necessary
because attorneys engage in self-evaluation and
improvement.
